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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on Energy Markets
Sultan A. Alturki
This dissertation includes three essays investigating topics relevant to the energy markets. The first
essay employs a new dataset to measure the impact of investor sentiment regarding oil prices on
the U.S. inflation premium. The empirical analysis relies on Structural Vector Autoregression
(SVAR) and out-of-sample forecasts. The results indicate that a one standard deviation positive
shock to overall investor sentiment regarding oil prices results in a significant increase in the U.S.
inflation premium by approximately 1.2% over the subsequent 10 weeks. Compared to individual
investor sentiment, institutional investor sentiment regarding oil prices has a larger impact on the
U.S. inflation premium. Finally, the study finds out-of-sample evidence that the overall investor
sentiment regarding oil prices has predictive power on the U.S. inflation premium.
The second essay uses sequential energy inventory announcements to shed new light on
the informational efficiency of financial markets. The findings provide clear evidence of
inefficiency in oil futures and stock markets. This inefficiency can be exploited by sophisticated
traders. The study further examines the effect of market conditions, such as liquidity and oil
attention, on the efficient incorporation of information in this setting. It also constructs a predictor
that can predict inventory surprises and pre-announcement returns in-sample and out-of-sample.
Finally, it develops a combination forecast that can be used as a proxy for market expectations of
oil inventory announcements.
The third essay examines the impact of oil shocks on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS)
for the G10 countries and major oil-exporting countries. The results show that oil demand shocks
have a uniformly negative impact on CDS spreads. In contrast, oil supply shocks increase the
spreads of the G10 countries, but reduce the spreads of oil-exporting countries. Using quantile
regressions, the study finds that oil demand shocks affect spreads across the conditional
distribution, while oil supply shocks mostly influence the upper quantiles of spread changes.
Furthermore, a two-state Markov-switching modeling confirms a significant non-linearity in the
impact of oil shocks
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation presents three essays investigating topics relevant to the energy markets.
The first essay examines the impact of investor sentiment regarding oil prices on the U.S.
inflation premium. Based on the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) analysis, a
positive one standard deviation shock to the overall investor sentiment regarding oil prices
results in a significant increase in the U.S. inflation premium by approximately 1.2% over
the subsequent 10 weeks. Compared to individual investor sentiment, institutional
investor sentiment regarding oil prices has a larger impact on the U.S. inflation premium.
In this paper, we employ a new dataset to measure investor sentiment regarding oil prices.
Therefore, investor sentiment regarding oil is an important factor that significantly
influences the U.S. inflation premium.
The second essay sheds light on market inefficiencies using unique sequential
energy inventory announcements. The main empirical results provide clear and
pronounced evidence of market inefficiency in oil futures and stock markets. Additionally,
market conditions, such as liquidity and oil attention, play an essential role in the efficient
incorporation of information in this setting. Furthermore, the study constructs a predictor
that has an in-sample and an out-of-sample predictive power over oil inventory surprises.
Finally, it develops a combination forecast that could be used to accurately proxy for
market expectations regarding oil inventory announcements. Hence, the results show that
asset prices do not instantaneously reflect new public information; which provides
profitable opportunities to several players in the financial markets.
The third essay examines the impact of oil shocks on sovereign credit default swaps
(CDS) for the G10 countries and major oil-exporting countries. The study shows that oil
demand shocks have a uniformly negative impact on CDS spreads. However, oil supply
ix

shocks increase the spreads of the CDS for the G10 countries, but reduce the spreads of
the major oil-exporting countries. Moreover, using quantile regressions the study finds
that oil demand shocks significantly affect spreads across the conditional distribution,
while oil supply shocks mostly influence the upper quantiles. Finally, a two-state Markovswitching modeling confirms a significant non-linearity in the impact of oil shocks.
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Essay 1. Oil Sentiment and the U.S. Inflation Premium

“Measures of short-term inflation compensation derived from yields on inflation-indexed Treasury
securities increased over the inter-meeting period, due in part to sharply higher prices for oil”
FOMC Minutes, June 24-25, 2008

1.1. Introduction
Oil plays a vital role in industrial economies. Nine out of ten post-World War II recessions were
preceded by significant increases in oil prices and oil price volatility (Hamilton, 2008). As noted
in the above quote from the FOMC minutes, sharp increases in oil prices often increase the
inflation compensation required by investors. Figure 1 displays the spot price of West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) on the left-hand axis and the U.S. 1-year breakeven inflation rate (inflation
premium) on the right-hand axis.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
It is clear that there is a close co-movement between oil prices and the U.S. breakeven inflation
rate for most of the period. We believe that the most likely mechanism through which oil price
impacts the breakeven inflation rate is the Fisher equation (𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡𝑒 ). Put simply, increases in
oil prices likely increase inflation compensation, which increases interest rates. Changes in interest
rates have a substantial influence on the valuation of assets. Hence, it is very important to analyze
factors that impact interest rates. Given the well-established link between investor sentiment and
equity markets (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Tetlock, 2007), our aim in this

*

This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Eric Olson.
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paper is to examine the effect that oil sentiment has on (1) oil future return and (2) the U.S. inflation
premium. We estimate a simple economic model through which oil sentiment affects both oil
future return and the U.S. inflation premium.
Kilian (2009) argues that variations in oil prices are primarily affected by supply shocks,
aggregate demand shocks, and the residual of the variation is classified as precautionary demand
shocks. Precautionary demand arises from fears regarding shortfalls in expected supply relative to
expected demand; for example, increased demand due to increased geopolitical risk in the Middle
East would be an example of a precautionary demand shock. To measure oil sentiment, we use a
weekly survey-based sentiment index collected by the German-based company SENTIX. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the SENTIX oil sentiment indices in this context. As
can be seen in Figure 2, the oil sentiment index shows substantial relevance to major events that
impact the oil market, thus, the index seems to mainly reflect concerns regarding future oil supply
and demand dynamics. Therefore, we believe that our oil sentiment measure captures oil
precautionary demand. Other researchers use survey-based sentiment indices in a similar way to
measure individuals’ concerns regarding different economic and financial indicators. For instance,
several papers use the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment to measure concerns and
uncertainty regarding the growth of household spending (Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox, 1994;
Souleles, 2004; Akhtar et al., 2011).
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
We use the U.S. breakeven inflation rates (BEIR), the difference between the yield of the
nominal bond and an inflation-linked bond with the same maturity, as a proxy for the inflation
premium. BEIR is widely and extensively used by central banks, practitioners, as well as
academics (Beechey, Johannsen, and Levin, 2011; Jochmann, Koop, and Potter, 2009; Garcia and
2

Van Rixtel, 2007). We adopt the framework of Kilian (2009) and classifying unexpected changes
in oil prices as supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks.
Hamilton and Baumeister (2019) critique Kilian’s (2009) identification assumptions in his
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR). Specifically, restrictions in SVAR usually force
researchers to assume no contemporaneous effect between the variables. Thus, the lower the
frequency of the data (i.e. annual data) the stronger the “no contemporaneous” identification
appears. For example, if we were to use quarterly data, the “no contemporaneous” identification
assumption would assume that a supply shock has no effect on the breakeven inflation rate within
the quarter. Obviously, that would be a strong assumption that is likely not valid. One needs to
balance modeling noise in very high frequency data (i.e. tick by tick data) versus identification of
the structural relationships. We believe using weekly data balances the validity of the “no
contemporaneous effect” identification assumption with the risk of simply modeling noise in the
data. We discuss our identification assumption in depth later.
To preview our results, we find that a one standard deviation increase in oil sentiment
increases the inflation premium by 1.2% over the subsequent ten weeks. This increase in the U.S.
inflation premium controls for aggregate demand and supply shocks. Furthermore, the institutional
investor oil sentiment has a greater impact on the U.S. inflation premium compared to the impact
of individual investor oil sentiment on the U.S. inflation premium. Thus, our results support recent
evidence that institutional investors may be better informed than individual investors (BenRephael, Da, and Israelsen, 2017; Roger, Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec, 2016; Sias, 2004). The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature and states our hypotheses,
section 1.3 discusses the data, section 1.4 discusses our methodology, section 1.5 presents and
discusses the empirical results and section 1.6 has our robustness checks. Section 1.7 contains our
conclusion.
3

1.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
The impact of sentiment in oil markets is a relatively new area of behavioral finance. Deeney et
al. (2015) analyze the role of sentiment by constructing an oil sentiment index using principal
component analysis. Their findings demonstrate the importance of sentiment in explaining oil price
movements. In addition, Li et al. (2016) show that sentiment Granger causes oil prices. MaslyukEscobedo, Rotaru, and Dokumentov (2016) perform a jump detection technique to identify cojumps and correlation between daily energy prices (spot and future) and sentiment indices. Their
results suggest a “significant influence in crude oil and aggregate sentiment indices on jumps in
energy commodity prices.” Sayim, Morris, and Rahman (2013) conduct an impulse response
function test which shows that a one standard deviation increase in the rational and irrational
investor sentiment results in a significant positive impact on oil industry returns. Finally, Dowling,
Cummins, and Lucey (2016) show the presence of psychological barriers around $10 price levels
for both WTI and Brent futures prices for the pre-credit crisis period of 1990-2006, when oil prices
were traded within low ranges.
Many proxies for sentiment have been chosen in the literature to analyze its impact on
financial and commodity markets. For the equity market, Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct a
stock market sentiment index with six proxies “the closed-end fund discount, NYSE share
turnover, the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the
dividend premium.” Using the same proxies, Huang et al. (2014) construct the aligned investor
sentiment index by implementing a partial least square (PLS), and Berger and Turtle (2015)
construct a cumulative sentiment index. Other papers use a variety of proxies, such as the level of
discounts on closed-end funds, the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases, and net mutual fund
redemption, buy-sell imbalance, and Wall Street Journal “Abreast of the Market” column, and net
exchange to equity funds (Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Ben4

Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl, 2012). On the other hand, sentiment in oil markets is measured using
a variety of methods. Similar to the proxies used in Baker and Wurgler (2006), Deeney et al. (2015)
measure sentiment in oil market by “the put–call ratio of oil options, the volume of the oil futures
traded, the historical volatility of the oil price, the ratio of speculative trades to oil demand and the
implied volatility of a local stock market index, namely the S&P 500 Energy sector for WTI and
the Euro Stoxx 50 for Brent.” A few other research papers use Thomson Reuters news releases to
capture oil market sentiment (Li et al., 2016; Maslyuk-Escobedo, Rotaru, and Dokumentov, 2016;
Sayim, Morris, and Rahman, 2013).
In this paper, we use a unique survey-based index, Oil SENTIX. There have been a few
other research papers that included different SENTIX indices but not the oil indices. Measuring
individual and institutional sentiment around five stock markets, Schmeling (2007) “shows that in
the long-horizon regressions, institutions (individuals) persistently have correct (incorrect)
expectations about the markets”. Further, Corredor, Ferrer, and Santamaria (2014) analyze the spot
and future stock markets dynamics for the U.S. and a few European countries during different
levels of investor sentiment. Menkhoff, Schmeling, and Schmidt (2012) examine whether
experience and professionalism affect the degree of overconfidence among different types of
investors. On the effect of weather-induced stock market sentiment, Schneider et al. (2014) “show
that individual long-term sentiment about stock markets is positively impacted by barometric
pressure.”
Breakeven inflation rates have been used extensively as a measure of inflation
compensation. This market-based inflation measure provides a higher frequency measure
compared to survey-based inflation measures resulting in a more dynamic and in-depth analysis.
Further, BEIR is attained from profit-maximizing agents; thus, it is a relatively accurate measure
5

of the unobserved inflation expectation (Kajuth and Watzka, 2011). Jochmann, Koop, and Potter
(2009) use daily breakeven inflation rates to study the relationship between the compensation of
long-term and short-term inflation. Their results indicate that inflation is neither unmoored nor
anchored, but it is apparently contained. Beechey et al. (2011) partially use BEIR to demonstrate
that inflation in the Euro area is more anchored compared to the U.S. Christensen, Lopez, and
Rudebusch (2010) decompose long-term BEIR into the inflation expectation and the inflation risk
premium (IRP). Their findings indicate that the average IRP is close to zero. Lumsdaine (2009)
finds that oil prices and BEIR of the U.S. comove, but the strength of the co-movement is timevarying. Jiang (2018) documents the significant impact of oil shocks on the 10-year U.S. BEIR.
However, to our knowledge, none of the previous studies investigate the impact of oil investor
sentiment on U.S. measures of inflation.
1.2.1 Initial Hypotheses
Inflation has a relatively strong correlation to oil prices for several reasons. Oil is considered as an
essential component that directly or indirectly enters into the production equation for almost all
industries (Cologni and Manera, 2008). Some industries are more sensitive than others are, but
they are still all influenced to some extent by changes in energy markets. Inflation uncertainty
increases with volatility in oil prices which in turn has a direct impact on asset pricing and
investment decisions due to adjusting discount and/or required rates of return (Huizinga, 1993;
Cologni and Manera, 2008). Hence, bullish sentiment regarding oil will prompt investors to require
a higher inflation premium to offset the reduction in purchasing power and the increase in risk.
Hypothesis 1.1: A positive shock to the overall investor sentiment regarding oil has a significant
impact on the U.S. inflation premium.
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Hypothesis 1.2: Overall investor sentiment regarding oil has predictive power over the U.S.
inflation premium.
Institutional investors are considered to be informed or smart investors as they have the capability
to process and to uncover asset-specific information more efficiently than individual investors
(Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar, 2013). However, institutional investors are still prone to
behavioral biases that influence their investment decisions. Roger et al. (2016) show that
institutions play a causal role with assets’ anomalies and strongly rejects the sophisticated
institution's hypothesis. Institutions demonstrate herding behavior as they follow each other to
invest in the same securities (Sias 2004). Additionally, institutional attention plays a more vital
role in explaining assets’ mispricing than retail attention (Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen, 2017).
These pieces of evidence lead us to believe that any behavioral bias by institutions may have a
higher impact on inflation premium than individuals’ biases.
Hypothesis 2.1: Institutional investor oil sentiment has a larger effect on the U.S. inflation
premium than individual investor oil sentiment has on the U.S. inflation premium.
1.3. Data
Our analysis covers the period between July 18 / 2008 – August 31 / 2019. The sample consists of
558 weekly observations. The selected time period was based on data availability. In this paper,
we use a weekly survey-based sentiment index collected by the German-based company SENTIX.
The data for SENTIX were accessed through Bloomberg. SENTIX has a database consisting of
more than 5000 individual and institutional investors and reflects overall oil sentiment for the onemonth price outlook. As noted above, the overall oil sentiment index is broken down into
individual and institutional investors’ indices. Institutional investors are defined as those who
register online using their firm e-mail address and go through an identity check. Individual
7

investors are those who register with their individual e-mail addresses. Finally, we use bond and
equity investor sentiment as part of our robustness checks to differentiate between the oil investor
sentiment and overall market investor sentiment.
Participating in the survey is conducted online through the company website
(www.sentix.de/index.php/en/), and a weekly reminder e-mail is sent to registered members. The
participation in the survey is not mandatory but participants are rewarded by access to some
exclusive data analysis as an incentive. In Oil SENTIX indices, participants are asked about their
expectations of oil prices in the short-term (one month). There are four answer choices which they
can select from bullish, bearish, neutral, and no opinion. In this paper, we use the short-term
Headline Oil SENTIX (SNTXOIH1), which reflects the concerns and beliefs of the survey’s
participants regarding oil prices after one month. The survey’s participants can take part in the
survey weekly from Friday – Saturday, Central European Time (SENTIX, 2016). In addition, the
index is constructed based on the so-called bull-bear-spread, which is used in several previous
research papers such as (Brown and Cliff, 2004; Brown and Cliff, 2005). The formula is:

Oil SENTIX Index =

# bullisht i , s − # bearisht i ,s
# bullisht i , s + # bearisht i ,s + # Neutralt i ,s

where the subscript t indicates time horizon (short-term), i and s denote individual investors and
institutional investors, respectively. Figure 2 displays the overall oil sentiment index over the
2008-2019 time period with the gray highlighted areas denoting key events (i.e. the Arab Spring,
Iran Sanctions fear, etc.). As we can see, the sentiment index spikes during times of critical events.
In order to measure oil prices, we use the continuous closest to expiration Brent oil future
contracts. The oil future prices are appropriately adjusted for contract rollovers. Furthermore, the
weekly Brent oil futures return has been deflated using the U.S. online-inflation index (MIT’s
8

Billion Price Project). All the Brent oil future contracts prices are provided by Genesis Financial
Technologies. As noted above, the Breakeven Inflation Rate (BEIR) is the difference between the
yield of a nominal bond and an inflation-linked bond with the same maturity. This market-based
inflation measure provides a higher frequency measure compared to survey-based inflation
measures resulting in a more dynamic and in-depth analysis. In this paper, we choose the 1-year
U.S. BEIR.1 Table 1 displays the summary statistics for all the data used in our analysis and Table
2 displays the unconditional correlations. Note in Table 1 that the mean of the 1-year U.S. inflation
premium is 0.74 and has a 0.16 correlation (Table 2) with the overall investor sentiment regarding
oil. However, the correlation decreases with longer horizons; for example, the U.S. the 5-year U.S.
inflation premium has only 0.11 correlation with the oil sentiment measures.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Here]
We use the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) as a proxy for worldwide economic activity which
represents the aggregate demand. It has been shown in numerous research papers that oil prices
are highly correlated and significantly impact global economic activities (Brown and Yücel, 2002;
Hamilton, 2009; He, Wang, and Lai, 2010). Shipping accounts for around 80% of internationally
traded goods and commodities.2 Additionally, freight rates are heavily dependent on oil prices as
it accounts for approximately 50%-60% of total operating costs (UNCTAD, 2010). Several
previous studies use a similar measure to capture the global economic activities (Kilian, 2009;
Kilian and Park, 2009); however, previous measures have a lower frequency (monthly), whereas
the BDI is published daily which allows us to aggregate it to a weekly measure. Figure 3 displays

1

We have retrieved the 2, 3,5, and 10 year U.S. breakeven inflation rate to conduct robustness checks. Furthermore,
all the BEIRs data was accessed through Bloomberg terminal.
2
https://www.balticexchange.com/about-us/shipping-markets
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the BDI index over our sample period. Furthermore, the BDI measure has been widely used in
previous academic research (Bakshi, Panayotov, and Skoulakis, 2011; Apergis and Payne, 2013).
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
We use the inflation measure developed from the Billion Price Project at MIT.3 The data
for this index is collected from scrapping prices from websites of large retails stores such as
Walmart. This index has a high frequency (daily) compared to the traditional monthly Consumer
Price Index (CPI).4 Further, it covers a substantial number of prices. In the United States,
approximately a half-million prices are collected daily, whereas the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
collects only eighty thousand prices monthly (Cavallo and Rigobon, 2016). As such, we use it to
transform our variables into real variables. Moreover, the U.S. online-price inflation index shows
significant reliability as it co-moves with the U.S. CPI (see figure 4). Finally, we use the Michigan
Inflation Expectation index, retrieved from Bloomberg, as part of our robustness checks.
1.4. Methodology
1.4.1. Empirical Model
As a preliminary, we conduct unit root tests to examine whether the time series contains a unit
root. The null hypothesis of the ADF test (𝐻0 ) is the series contains a unit root. In our data, all the
variables were stationary with the exception of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate; as
such, we use first differences for the 10-year Treasury. The VAR model estimated included the
following four weekly endogenous variables: overall oil sentiment, the real growth rate of Baltic
Dry index, Brent oil future real return, and the U.S. 1-year BEIR. We include two exogenous

3

We are grateful to Prof. Alberto Cavallo and Prof. Roberto Rigobon in the Sloan School of Management at MIT and
founders of the Billion Prices Project for sharing their private data.
4
Due to our lack of access to the Billion Prices Project after September 2016, we use the monthly U.S. CPI to transform
our variables into real variables.
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variables (the credit spread and the first difference of the 10-year Treasury) to control for
macroeconomic conditions. The estimated reduced VAR takes the following form:
𝑝

𝑘

𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
𝐽=1

(1)

𝐽=1

where Yt-j is the vector of the four endogenous variables, Xt-j is a vector of exogenous variables,
and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. The shocks satisfy the condition
E(𝜀𝑡 𝜀𝑡 ′) = I, which is, the shocks’ series are uncorrelated white noise. In addition, 𝑐0 is a vector of
constants, 𝐴𝑗 and 𝐵𝑗 are coefficient matrices. The lag length was selected using the likelihood ratio
tests.5 As noted above, in order to control for macroeconomic conditions and the state of the
business cycle, we include the first difference of the ten-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury rate
and the credit spread, defined as the difference between the Moody’s BAA and AAA bonds. The
weekly time series of the above variables were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis FRED database.
1.4.2. Identification From SVAR
In order to obtain structural impulse responses, (1) is rewritten in its moving average
representation. That is:
𝑌𝑡 = B(L) 𝑣𝑡 ,

(2)

𝐽
where B(L) is (4  4) convergent matrix with B(L) = ∑∞
𝑗=0 𝐵𝑗 𝐿 and 𝐵0 = 𝐼4 . 𝑣𝑡 is a vector of (4 

1) of reduced-form residuals assumed to be identically and independently distributed, 𝑣𝑡 ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0,

5

The maximum number of lags allowed in a VAR model should be no more than mp + 1 < T where m is the number
of endogenous variables, p is the number of lags, and T is the total number of observations (Brandt and Williams
2006) pg.26.
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𝛺). Further, we assume that the reduced-form residuals (𝑣𝑡 ) have a linear combination with the
structural shocks (𝜀𝑡 ) such that:
𝑣𝑡 = 𝑆𝜀𝑡

(3)

where S is the (4  4) contemporaneous covariance matrix. Thus, we can express (1) as
𝑌𝑡 = C(L) 𝜀𝑡

(4)

which implies B(L)S = C(L). In order to uniquely identify S, we must impose additional identifying
restrictions. Thus, we first order the vector of uncorrelated structural shocks as 𝜀𝑡 =
[𝜀 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝜀 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐 , 𝜀 𝑜𝑖𝑙 , 𝜀 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅 ] where 𝜀 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡. is the oil sentiment, 𝜀 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐 is the real growth rate of Baltic
Dry Index, 𝜀 𝑜𝑖𝑙 is Brent oil future real return, and 𝜀 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅 is the U.S. 1-year BEIR.
We follow the literature in imposing our restrictions and use non-recursive identifying
restrictions (Sims 1986; Blanchard and Watson, 1986; Bernanke, 1986). Under the non-recursive
approach, variables could have a contemporaneous effect regardless of their ordering in the VAR.
For example, oil futures return could have an impact on overall oil sentiment and vice-versa
regardless of the order in which they entered the VAR system (Kim and Roubini, 2000). On the
other hand, for a variable to have an impact on other variables, under the recursive approach, this
variable has to enter first in the VAR system, which is not appealing in our case.
The number of restrictions has to be (n × ( n – 1))/2 in order to achieve identification,
where n is the number of variables (Kim and Roubini, 2000). Since we have four variables, the
needed number of restrictions is six. To identify the restrictions, we use economic and finance
theory and impose the following restrictions:
Sent _ onet


 S11
 Baltic _ real _ return 
S
t

= B( L)  22
 Oil _ real _ returnt 
 S31



BEIRt
 S41


12

S12
S22
S32
S42

S13
0
S33
S43

0    tSent 


0   tBlatic 
0    tOil 


S44    tBEIR 

(5)

Thus, we assume:
1- It is assumed that the U.S. BEIR shock does not have a contemporaneous effect on the overall
oil sentiment, the real growth rate of Baltic Dry Index and oil futures real return, which are
the three zeros in column 4.
2- It is also assumed that oil futures real return shock does not have a contemporaneous effect
on the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index, which is the zero in column 3.
Given that the matrix in (5) is two restrictions short, we impose the following long-run
restrictions. A shock to oil sentiment (overall oil sentiment) has no long-run effect on itself and on
the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index. The restrictions can be imposed by setting the values
∞
of the infinite number of relevant lag coefficients in equations (3) and (4), ∑∞
𝑗 𝐶11 and ∑𝑗 𝐶21

equal to zero (Olivier Jean Blanchard and Quah 1989; Bjørnland and Leitemo 2009). The long∞
run restrictions of ∑∞
𝑗 𝐶11 and ∑𝑗 𝐶21 imply the following linear restrictions:

𝐵11 (1)𝑆11 + 𝐵12 (1)𝑆21 + 𝐵13 (1)𝑆31 + 𝐵14 (1)𝑆41= 0

(6)

𝐵21 (1)𝑆11 + 𝐵22 (1)𝑆21 + 𝐵23 (1)𝑆31 + 𝐵24 (1)𝑆41 = 0

(7)

The restrictions on the fourth column imply that the overall investor sentiment regarding
oil, the real growth rate of Baltic Dry Index and oil futures real return do not contemporaneously
respond to a shock in the U.S. 1-year BEIR. These restrictions are similar to the restrictions
imposed by Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009). As mentioned before, the literature has
shown that oil has an impact on inflation, whereas, the impact of inflation on oil has very weak
evidence in the literature. Moreover, the restrictions in our model are moderated and more
reasonable as we are using weekly frequency data. Furthermore, the restriction on the third column
implies that the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index, a proxy for aggregate demand shock, does
not contemporaneously respond to oil futures real return. This restriction is consistent with the
13

literature, which asserts that the response of the aggregate demand shock, which reflects the global
real economic activity, is sluggish to changes in real oil price/return (Kilian, 2009).
The restriction on the first column implies that a shock to investor sentiment regarding oil
has no long-term effect on itself and on the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index, a proxy for
aggregate demand shock. Oil sentiment as it reflects fears and uncertainty regarding the oil market
does not have a long-lasting impact on aggregate demand. Aggregate demand is mostly driven by
strategic planning, so it is expected to dissipate the effect of fears regarding the status of the oil
market in the long run.6 Furthermore, we assume that the overall oil sentiment to have no long-run
impact on itself for a couple of reasons. Fears and uncertainty regarding the oil market most likely
to be mitigated in the long run as events unfold, and investors acquire more relevant information.
For instance, a shocking geopolitical event may immediately increase fears and uncertainty
regarding the oil market, but this fear is expected to evaporate as participants of the oil market
actively acquire more information.
1.5. Empirical Results and Discussion
1.5.1. Impulse Response Functions
Figures 5 - 7 present the cumulative impulse response functions, where column 1 shows the
response to shocks in the oil sentiment, column 2 shows the responses to shocks in the real rate
of Dry Baltic (aggregate demand shock), column 3 shows the response to the real return of oil
futures (supply shock), and column 4 shows the responses to shocks in the U.S. BEIR (inflation
premium).

6

Several real world examples support this restriction. For example, the recent attack in the Saudi oil company
(Aramco) in September 2019, and many others.

14

The accumulated impulse response functions (IRF) are plotted in Figure 5 for all the four
endogenous variables over the ten-week horizon. Note that the results in column 1 are consistent
with results one would expect from increased fears of possible negative aggregate supply shocks.7
In column 1 row 2, a positive one standard deviation shock to the overall oil sentiment results in
a negative contemporaneous effect on changes in the real Baltic index (aggregate demand). Due
to the relatively fixed amount of global supply in the short term, we believe an increase in oil
precautionary demand, which is mainly captured by oil sentiment, would result in a decrease in
the aggregate demand (Peersman and Robays, 2012; Jo, 2014). In addition, a positive shock to
sentiment increases Brent oil future real return (column 1, row 3) by about 3% in the first week,
and a significant cumulative return of 2.91% over the next ten weeks.8 Furthermore, a shock to
the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry index in column 2 results in a significant Brent oil future
real return of about 1.02% in the first week, and a significant cumulative return of 2.46% over the
next ten weeks. However, note in the second column that a shock to the Baltic Dry index
(aggregate demand) does not have any meaningful effect on oil sentiment whereas a shock to the
futures price of oil has a positive and statistically significant effect on oil sentiment (column 3
row 1).
As noted above, the breakeven inflation rate (BEIR) captures the premium required by
investors to bear the burden of both expected inflation and inflation risk. Thus, we expect investors
to require a higher inflation premium if they feel the future price of oil will increase. The impulse
responses in column 1 of Figure 5 show that a positive one standard deviation shock to the overall
oil sentiment results in a significant increase in the U.S. 1-year inflation premium of about 0.05%

7

Able, Bernanke, and Croushore (2010) use increases in oil prices during the 1970s as examples of negative aggregate
supply shocks.
8
The results are robust and significant when we use oil spot and future prices instead of return.
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in the first week, and a significant cumulative increase of 1.22% over the next ten weeks.
Furthermore, column 2 of Figure 5 shows a shock to the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry index
results in a significant increase on the U.S. 1-year inflation premium of about 0.04% in the first
week and a significant cumulative increase of 0.23% over the next 5 weeks, and a cumulative
increase of 0.43% over the next ten weeks. The oil demand shock seems to have a lower and shortterm significant impact on the inflation premium compared to the other shocks. This indicates that
investors consider increases in oil prices driven by the demand side as good news and a sign of a
strong economy. Furthermore, evidence shows that the U.S. economy demonstrates resilience to
oil price increases driven by the demand side (Kilian, 2009). Finally, column 3 of Figure 5
demonstrates the cumulative 10-week response of the U.S. 1-year inflation premium to the oil
future real return (supply shock) is approximately equal to 1.08%. These results are highly
significant given that the mean of the U.S. 1-year inflation premium is 0.74%.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
Overall, our results indicate that the oil sentiment measure is capturing concerns about potential
disruptions in the oil market that are most likely driven by geopolitical and economic concerns
given our sample period.
Furthermore, the overall oil sentiment measure is decomposed into institutional and
individual oil sentiment indices and re-estimate the SVAR (see Figures 6 and 7). Our results in
column 1 of Figures 6 and 7 show that institutional investor oil sentiment has a greater impact on
the U.S. inflation premium (1-year BEIR) compared to the impact of individual investor oil
sentiment on the U.S. inflation premium. Column 1 of Figure 6 illustrates that a shock to the
institutional investor oil sentiment results in a significant cumulative increase of 1.43% in the U.S.
inflation premium over the next 10 weeks, while column 1 of Figure 7 shows that a shock to the
16

individual investor oil sentiment results in a significant cumulative increase of 1.15% in the U.S.
inflation premium over the next 10 weeks. While the point estimates certainly appear different,
given the size of the standard errors, we are not able to definitively argue that the impulse responses
are statistically different from each other. Again, note also that the results in Figures 6 and 7 are
consistent with the oil sentiment indices capturing concerns about potential macroeconomic supply
shocks.
[Insert Figures 6 and 7 Here]
1.5.2. Structural Variance Decomposition
In order to better understand the dynamics of the structural VAR, we also estimate the structural
variance decomposition. Specifically, we would like to address the question regarding the relative
importance of each random shock in explaining the fluctuation in the U.S. inflation premium.
Hence, we compute the forecast error variance decomposition from the estimated structural VAR
model. This estimation allows allocating the percentage of the forecast error variance to the
individual shocks. The total percentage of the variance of the error should add up to 100% at a
given forecast horizon.
Table 3 displays the results of the structural variance decompositions at two different
horizons: 5 weeks and 10 weeks. The column variables explain the amount of variance of the row
variable. The BEIR rows in each of the two panels are italicized. Note that the oil sentiment index
explains almost 11.60% of the variation of the BEIR over five weeks, and almost 17% over the
subsequent 10 weeks. The real returns of oil explain 9.21% of the BEIR variation over five weeks,
and 13.10% over a ten-week time period. Also, note that the oil sentiment index explains nearly
half of the variance of the oil returns over both time horizons. Again, these results are consistent
with the story that oil sentiment is capturing investor concerns about potential supply disruptions.
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[Insert Table 3 Here]
1.5.3. Forecasting Models
Finally, we also develop several forecasting models to examine the out-of-sample predictability of
the oil sentiment on the inflation premium, measured by the U.S. 1-year BEIR. Welch and Goyal
(2008) posit that significant in-sample predictive power doesn’t ensure significant out-of-sample
predictive ability. We follow Welch and Goyal (2008) to develop our benchmark model as a no
predictability model which is the constant expected U.S. 1-year BEIR model:
𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜀𝑡 .

(8)

Afterward, we compare our baseline model against four competing predictive regression models:
𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡

(9)

𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡

(10)

𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡

(11)

𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡

(12)

To compare our baseline with other competing predictive models, we compute the cumulative
squared prediction errors for each regression. Subsequently, we construct our lines by computing
the cumulative squared prediction errors of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction
errors of the ALTERNATIVE. Hence, an increase in a line indicates better performance of the
ALTERNATIVE model and a decrease in the line indicates better performance of the NULL. Thus,
we follow the literature in which the OOS forecast starts after 20 weeks from the beginning of the
data.
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In Figure 8, we find that the overall investor sentiment regarding oil can predict the U.S.
inflation premium, measured by the 1-year U.S. BEIR. Furthermore, the aggregate demand,
measured by the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index has also significant predictability over
the inflation premium. However, the real return of oil does not seem to predict the inflation
premium. We believe this is consistent with the findings of Kilian (2009) in which the supply
shock of oil has a minimal impact on the macroeconomic aggregates.
[Insert Figure 8 Here]
1.6. Robustness Checks
We conduct several alternative tests to gauge the robustness of our results. First, we estimate the
generalized impulse response function (IRF) and the generalized historical decomposition (HD)
(see Figure 9).9 The main objective of estimating the generalized impulse response is to
demonstrate the results of the same model without imposing any restrictions. All the results are
consistent with the SVAR results. Columns 1 and 3 of Figure 9, show that a positive one standard
deviation shock to the overall oil sentiment and the real return of oil futures result in a significant
cumulative increase in U.S. 1-year inflation premium by approximately 1.25% and 1.70%
respectively. However, column 2 of Figure 9 demonstrates that a shock to the real growth rate of
Baltic Dry Index results in an insignificant cumulative increase in the U.S. 1-year BEIR by 0.14%.
This is consistent with our SVAR results that investors consider increases in oil prices driven by
the demand side as good news and a sign of a strong economy.
[Insert Figure 9 Here]
Second, we substitute the breakeven inflation rate with an actual measure of the U.S.
inflation, which is the online-price inflation index. This index is developed out of the Billion Price

9

For the sake of brevity, historical decomposition results and graphs can be provided upon request.
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Project at MIT. The index was constructed by scraping prices from websites of giant stores such
as Walmart. We include an actual measure of inflation to validate that sentiment regarding oil has
an evident and significant impact on an actual measure of inflation. Subsequently, this impact
should be reflected in inflation premiums measured by BEIR. The impulse responses show that a
positive one standard deviation shock to the overall oil sentiment, and the real return of oil futures
result in a significant cumulative increase on the online-price inflation index by 0.10%, 0.15%,
respectively. Again, we conclude that the results are consistent with our evidence on the U.S.
inflation premium.10
Additionally, we address the concern that the oil sentiment measure is just a reflection of
market sentiment or inflation expectation. We use a U.S. bond market sentiment to evaluate the
impact on the U.S. 1-year inflation premium. The main reason for using a bond market sentiment
is that the inflation premium measure, BEIR, calculated as the difference between the nominal
bond yield and the real bond yield. Hence, a bond sentiment measure is more relevant than the
sentiment for other markets.11 We use the overall SENTIX U.S. bond sentiment index to conduct
our analysis. This index is constructed exactly the same as the overall oil sentiment which allows
us to compare the two. The results show that a shock to the overall bond sentiment has an
insignificant impact on both the real return of oil futures and the U.S. inflation premiums (U.S. 1year BEIR) (see Figure 10). Another concern is that oil sentiment is just a reflection of inflation
expectations. Thus, we repeat our main analysis by adding the Michigan Inflation Expectation
index as a control variable. Our results are robust and remain almost the same.12 This contributes

The results are based on the following sample period July 2008 – September 2016 as we don’t have access to the
data before and after this period. For the sake of brevity, results and graphs can be provided upon request of the
authors.
11
We conduct an additional robustness check using Sentix U.S. equity market sentiment. The results are very similar
to those for the bond sentiment showing insignificant impact of equity market sentiment on the U.S. BEIR. The IRf
graphs can be provided upon request by the authors.
12
Historical decomposition results and graphs are omitted to save space.
10

20

to the evidence that the oil sentiment is mostly driven by the oil market rather than the general
financial market.
[Insert Figure 10 Here]
We also conduct our analysis with several U.S. BEIRs maturities to further examine the
impact on the short-term and long-term. We conduct the same analysis on the 2, 3,5 7, and 10 year
U.S. breakeven inflation rate. Our results are robust among all of the short term time horizons.13
The short-term U.S. BEIR (2, 3 and 5 year) show a significant impact of the overall oil sentiment
on the inflation premium.
1.7. Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the impact of oil sentiment on the U.S.
inflation premium, measured by the breakeven inflation rate (BEIR). Our main findings
demonstrate a significant influence of investor sentiment regarding oil prices on the U.S. inflation
premium. A positive one standard deviation shock to investor sentiment regarding oil prices results
in a significant cumulative increase of 1.2% for the U.S. inflation premium over the following ten
weeks. Furthermore, the institutional investor oil sentiment has a greater impact on the U.S.
inflation premium compared to the impact of individual investor oil sentiment on the U.S. inflation
premium, although we cannot determine whether the two are statistically different from each other.
These results are highly significant given that the mean of the U.S. inflation premium is 0.74%.
Additionally, we find out-of-sample evidence that overall investor sentiment regarding oil along
with the other oil-related measures to have predictability power over the U.S. inflation premium.
Our results could potentially benefit policymakers, managers of firms, and investors, among
others. Monetary policymakers should take investor sentiment regarding oil as a proxy to

13

For the sake of brevity, results and graphs can be provided upon request by the authors.
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determine investors’ beliefs about potential disruptions in oil markets. In addition, firms may need
to estimate investor oil sentiment to gauge investors’ risk appetite as it directly impacts their cost
of capital. Finally, investors and fund managers could refine their investment strategies by
incorporating investor sentiment regarding oil prices.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table includes the variables used in the analysis. These variables are overall oil sentiment,
individual oil sentiment, institutional oil sentiment, the real rate of Baltic Dry index, real return of t oil
futures, 5-year U.S. BEIR, 1-year U.S. BEIR, and bond investor sentiment. All variables are in weekly
intervals. And the sample period is between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019.

Overall
Oil Sen.

Individual
Oil Sent.

Institutional
Oil Sent.

Real
Rate
of Dry
Baltic

Real
Return
of Oil
Futures

1-year
U.S.
BEIR

5-year
U.S.
BEIR

Bond Sent.

Mean

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.00

-0.26

0.74

1.65

-0.06

Median

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.00

0.15

0.94

1.77

-0.06

Maximum

0.56

0.57

0.54

0.53

19.93

4.50

2.47

0.30

Minimum

-0.44

-0.47

-0.43

-0.35

-29.77

-6.17

-0.78

-0.49

Std. Dev.

0.18

0.18

0.16

0.10

4.55

1.36

0.50

0.14

Skewness

0.11

0.12

0.05

0.36

-0.74

-1.84

-2.24

-0.06

Kurtosis

2.87

2.86

2.91

4.89

7.60

9.22

9.87

2.60

Observations

558

558

558

558

558

558

558

558
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Table 2: Correlations
The table reports the correlations of the variables used in the study. The variables are overall oil
sentiment, individual oil sentiment, institutional oil sentiment, the real rate of Baltic Dry index, real
return of t oil futures, 5-year U.S. BEIR, 1-year U.S. BEIR, bond investor sentiment, U.S. online
inflation index. Our sample covers the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019.

Overall Oil
Sen.

Real
Real
1-year
Individual Institutional Rate of Return of
U.S.
Oil Sent. Oil Sent.
Dry
Oil
BEIR
Baltic Futures

5-year
U.S.
BEIR

Individual Oil
Sent.

0.99

1.00

Institutional Oil
Sent.

0.95

0.92

1.00

Real Rate of
Dry Baltic

0.08

0.08

0.06

1.00

Real Return of
Oil Futures

0.56

0.55

0.56

0.10

1.00

1-year U.S.
BEIR

0.16

0.18

0.06

0.06

0.15

1.00

5-year U.S.
BEIR

0.11

0.13

0.03

0.05

0.16

0.81

1.00

Bond Sent.

-0.29

-0.28

-0.30

-0.04

-0.24

-0.18

-0.18
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Bond
Sent.

1.00

Table 3: Structural Variance Decompositions
This table presents the Structural Variance Decompositions at the 5-week and 10-week horizons. we
compute the forecast error variance decomposition from the following estimated structural VAR model
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑𝑘𝐽=1 𝐴𝑗 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑𝑝𝐽=1 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous
variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future real return, and the
U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate
the structural VAR. Our sample covers the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019.
5 Weeks
Oil Sentiment
Baltic Dry
Index
Real Futures
Return
BEIR

Oil Sentiment

Baltic Dry Index

Real Futures Return

BEIR

1.68

0.36

97.21

0.74

5.95

92.82

0.99

0.24

51.82

6.24

38.27

3.67

11.57

1.92

9.21

77.30

10 Weeks
Oil Sentiment
Baltic Dry
Index
Real Futures
Return
BEIR

Oil Sentiment

Baltic Dry Index

Real Futures Return

BEIR

1.70

0.54

96.81

0.95

7.60

89.06

2.64

0.68

50.62

7.15

37.88

4.35

16.95

2.19

13.10

67.75
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Figure 1: WTI Prices and the 1-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate
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Figure 2: Oil Sentiment
This figure shows the overall oil sentiment for the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019.
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Figure 3: Real Growth Rate of Baltic Dry Index
This figure real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) for the period between July 18, 2008
– August 31, 2019.

Real Growth Rate of Baltic Dry Index
0.6
0.5

Post Financial Crisis

0.4

Extreme Fluctuation
during the Collpase of
oil Prices

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4

Financial Crisis

Global Economic
Slowdown

27

Slowing Economic
activity due to U.S. China trade tension

Figure 4: The U.S. Online-Price Inflation Index
The figures show the online-price inflation index (PriceStats) along the U.S. CPI (BLS), both at monthly
frequency.14

14

Source: The Billion Prices Project website (http://www.thebillionpricesproject.com/usa/). The graphs were accessed on Aug/2017.
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Figure 5: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Overall Oil Sentiment
𝑝
This figure shows accumulative structural impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑𝑘𝐽=1 𝐴𝑗 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑𝐽=1 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future real return,
and the U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample covers
the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks.
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Figure 6: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Institutional Oil Sentiment
𝑝
This figure shows accumulative structural impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑𝑘𝐽=1 𝐴𝑗 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑𝐽=1 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables institutional oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future return,
and the U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample
covers the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks.
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Figure 7: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Individual Oil Sentiment
𝑝
This figure shows accumulative structural impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑𝑘𝐽=1 𝐴𝑗 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑𝐽=1 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of Baltic Dthe ry Index, Brent oil future return, and the
U.S. 5-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample covers the
period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks.
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Figure 8: The Out of Sample Forecasting Models of the U.S. 1-year BEIR
These figures plot the IS and OOS performance of weekly predictive regressions. Particularly, these are the cumulative squared predictions errors
of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction errors of the ALTERNATIVE. ALTERNATIVE is a model that relies on predictive variables
noted above each graph. The NULL is a no predictability baseline model which is the constant expected U.S. 1-year BEIR (BEIR t = β0 + 𝜀𝑡 ).
An increase in a line indicates better performance of the ALTERNATIVE model; a decrease in a line indicates better performance of the NULL.
The sample period covers the period July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019.
ALTERNATIVE Model 1 Equation: 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀

ALTERNATIVE Model 2 Equation: 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀

ALTERNATIVE Model 3 Equation: 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜀

ALTERNATIVE Model 4 Equation: 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝜀
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Figure 9: The Accumulative Generalized Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Overall Oil Sentiment
𝑝
This figure shows accumulative generalized impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑𝑘𝐽=1 𝐴𝑗 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑𝐽=1 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 +
𝜀𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future return, and
the U.S. 5-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample covers
the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks.
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Figure 10: The Accumulative Generalized Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Bond Sentiment
This figure shows accumulative generalized impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑𝑘𝐽=1 𝐴𝑗 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 +
∑𝑝𝐽=1 𝐵𝑗 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables bond sentiment, real rate of Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future real
return, and the U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our
sample covers the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks.
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Essay 2. Market Inefficiencies Surrounding Energy Announcements

2.1. Introduction
Oil inventory announcements move energy markets. These announcements provide essential
signals regarding the supply and demand of oil. Two of the primary energy announcements, made
by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
occur weekly. These two public announcements provide very similar fundamental information,
and they are closely followed by traders in financial markets. According to the efficient market
hypothesis, fundamental public information should be immediately impounded into asset prices.
The immediate price adjustment prevents traders from exploiting public information to make
profitable trades (French and Roll, 1986).
There is no consensus regarding the efficiency of oil futures markets. While some studies
have found that oil futures are highly efficient (Tabak and Cajueiro, 2007; Wang and Yang, 2010;
Kristoufek and Vosvrda, 2014; Kristoufek, 2018), others have found oil prices to be less efficient
(Shambora and Rossiter, 2007; Alvarez-Ramirez, Alvarez, and Solis, 2010). Several studies find
evidence of informed trading before energy inventory announcements. Gu and Kurov (2018) show
that trading prior to the EIA weekly natural gas announcements is driven by informed traders who
rely on superior forecasting skills. Rousse and Sévi (2019) suggest that information leakage is a
potential cause of the observed trading pattern prior to the weekly oil inventory announcements

*

This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Alexander Kurov.
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released by the EIA.
The API oil inventory announcements are followed 18 hours later by the oil inventory
announcements from the EIA. We use the unique sequential nature of these events to analyze the
efficiency of oil futures markets and to explain the evidence of informed trading before the EIA
oil announcements. We utilize the same setting to contribute to the literature on stock market
efficiency. In addition, we construct a simple predictor that can be used to predict inventory
surprises and pre-announcement returns. We ask the following relevant questions: (1) How do
market conditions influence market efficiency around energy announcements? (2) Can we utilize
public news about energy to predict inventory surprises and asset prices? (3) Can we construct an
improved forecast of energy announcements?
We find that the oil futures return after the API announcements significantly predicts the
return before the EIA announcements. This finding provides strong evidence that oil futures do
not immediately incorporate all of the public information released by the API. Thus, our results
indicate that the price drift before the EIA oil announcements documented by Rousse and Sévi
(2019) can be explained by delayed adjustment to public information.
Market conditions, such as liquidity and oil attention, can influence market efficiency.
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008), examine the role of liquidity in market efficiency. They
find that the predictability of returns from past order flows decreases when liquidity is high. Akbas,
Armstrong, Sorescu, and Subrahmanyam (2016) find that financial markets become more efficient
when investors put more capital in mutual funds that trade on market anomalies. Furthermore,
higher trading activity of algorithmic and high-frequency traders facilitates liquidity and price
discovery (Hasbrouck and Saar 2013; Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan 2014). Therefore, high
liquidity should facilitate the efficient incorporation of information in oil futures prices. Consistent
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with this expectation, we find that the oil futures returns after the API oil announcements
significantly predict the pre-EIA announcement returns only during periods of low liquidity.
Additionally, attention is a limited cognitive resource that investors need to allocate to
information they believe is important (Kahneman, 1973). Thus, public information should be
efficiently incorporated into prices when investors pay attention to it. Barber and Odean
(2008)show that investors tend to buy stocks that they pay more attention to. Han, Lv, and Yin
(2017) find that oil-related SVI forecasts daily and weekly oil prices in both in-sample and out-ofsample tests. We construct an oil-related Internet search activity measure similar to the one
described in Han, Lv, and Yin (2017). Our findings indicate that the predictive ability of the postAPI announcement oil futures return for the pre-EIA announcement return is confined to periods
of low attention to oil.
Furthermore, we contribute to the debate regarding whether changes in oil prices can
predict stock returns. Huang et al. (1996) find that oil futures are not correlated with or linked to
the stock market, except stocks of oil companies. However, others have found that oil has a
significant impact on stock markets depending on the type of oil shock (Chiang, Hughen, and Sagi,
2015; Kilian and Park, 2009; Ready, 2018), the specific sectors of the stock markets (Fan and
Jahan-Parvar, 2012), and whether the market is international or domestic (Hu and Xiong, 2013).
We find that the opening prices of oil companies do not fully incorporate oil inventory information
released after trading hours. The post-API announcement oil futures return is a significant
predictor of the returns of oil companies on the following day.
Previous results suggest the importance of the information released by the API in shaping
the market expectations for the EIA oil announcements the following day. Most of the literature
evaluates the impact of EIA announcements by considering one proxy for market expectation; for
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example, Bloomberg median consensus, as described in Halova, Kurov, and Kucher (2014) and
Wolfe and Rosenman (2014), Reuters forecast as described in Bu (2014), or the API actual as
described in Armstrong, Cardella, and Sabah (2017). We construct a predictor based on the
difference between the API actual and the Bloomberg consensus forecast. The predictor has
significant explanatory power over the pre-EIA announcement return. In addition, a simple trading
strategy based on the predictor would generate an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.67 in the full
sample, and an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.1 when the predictor has large values.
Finally, we employ the relative importance method to construct a combination forecast of
the EIA oil announcements by objectively allocating weights to the Bloomberg median consensus
and API actual (Grömping, 2006; Johnson and Lebreton, 2004; Thomas, Zhu, Zumbo, and Dutta,
2017). Using our combination forecast as a proxy for market expectations increases the R2 in the
regression of oil futures returns on inventory surprises by approximately 130% compared to the
Bloomberg consensus forecast, and by approximately 17% compared to the API actual. Hence,
using the combination forecast to compute oil inventory surprises reduces measurement errors that
could stem from the use of a single stale proxy for market expectations. We show that using the
combination forecast to compute inventory surprises provides more accurate estimates that are
closer to those generated by employing the Identification Through Censoring (ITC) technique
proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2008). The ITC technique is employed to adjust for the bias caused
by measurement error in announcement surprises.
Our study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, we provide clear
evidence of market inefficiency in the oil futures market using a unique setting of sequential energy
announcements. We examine how different market conditions influence this inefficiency. Second,
we show that a similar inefficiency is also present in the stock market. Specifically, opening prices
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of energy stocks do not fully incorporate public information released after the market close the day
before. Third, we show that mere public information can be used to predict inventory surprises and
oil futures returns before the EIA announcements. This alleviates the concerns about possible
preannouncement information leakage. Finally, we construct a combination forecast of the EIA oil
announcements that is more accurate than other commonly used measures of market expectations.
A similar approach may be useful in creating forecasts of other public announcements.
2.2. Literature Review
As mentioned above, the literature has not reached a consensus regarding the efficiency of the oil
markets. Shambora and Rossiter (2007) employ an artificial neural network to uncover hidden
trading patterns in the oil futures and show the possibility of superior return using the network.
Alvarez-Ramirez, Alvarez, and Solis (2010) use detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) to analyze
the efficiency of the daily spot price of WTI crude oil. They find that crude oil exhibits some
deviations from efficiency; however, their results seem to depend on the state of the economy. On
the other hand, Wang and Liu (2010) find that the behavior of WTI at different measurement
frequencies is consistent with informational efficiency. These results are consistent with the
findings of Alvarez-Ramirez, Alvarez, and Rodriguez (2008). Wang and Yang (2010) use intraday
data for crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, and natural gas futures and test the efficiency of these
markets using several nonlinear models. They find that the crude oil and gasoline futures markets
are efficient, but heating oil and natural gas futures show weak-form efficiency only during the
bull market. Kristoufek and Vosvrda (2014) investigate the market efficiency in 25 commodity
futures. They find WTI crude oil, heating oil, and coffee to be the most efficient compared to the
other commodities. Kristoufek (2018) replicated the earlier study by Tabak and Cajueiro (2007)
with extended data up to June 2017. The results show that the efficiency fluctuates over time for
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both WTI and Brent crude oil but the oil market has been more efficient recently compared to the
1990s. Furthermore, WTI oil shows stronger evidence of efficiency compared to Brent oil.
The literature is very sparse in regards to trading around energy announcements. Rousse
and Sévi (2019) investigate informed trading around the EIA oil inventory announcements. They
find some “suspicious trading” patterns before the announcements as there are significant order
imbalances on the days of oil inventory surprises. They suggest that “the inventory level released
by the DOE each Wednesday is known by some market participants who can benefit from their
insider position to make money with the news.” Our paper differs from theirs in several aspects.
First, our findings point towards sophisticated trading that is driven by mere public information
which includes the API announcement in the day before. Second, we investigate sophisticated
trading around both EIA and API announcements. Our findings indicate that the significant preannouncement drift exists only before the EIA release. This provides evidence that some traders
have superior skills for digesting and processing public information.
In a related paper, Gu and Kurov (2018) find evidence of informed trading, a drift in the
right direction, before the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report. The difference between forecasts
of analysts with superior historical forecasting ability and the Bloomberg consensus forecast
predicts inventory surprises and the pre-announcement returns of natural gas futures. Our paper
differs from Gu and Kurov's (2018) study in several ways. First, we show that the oil futures return
following the API inventory announcements is a significant predictor of the pre-EIA
announcement returns. This is a clear violation of the weak-form market efficiency. Second, we
examine market conditions that influence the return predictability around the release of the Weekly
Petroleum Status Report. Third, in addition to looking at the efficiency of the oil futures market
we show evidence of inefficiency in stocks of oil companies.
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The literature on the impact of macroeconomic news on asset prices is extensive.15
However, the literature regarding energy announcements is limited. Miao et al. (2018) show that
oil inventory announcements shocks have a significant impact on oil futures and options prices.
Wolfe and Rosenman (2014) study the bidirectional causality of oil and gas inventory
announcements shocks. They analyze how these shocks are transmitted from one market to the
other. They find that the impact of gas inventory announcements on oil futures volatility is stronger
than the effect of oil announcements on gas futures volatility. Both Miao et al. (2018) and Wolfe
and Rosenman (2014) use the Bloomberg median consensus to proxy for the market expectation
of the announcements. Bu (2014) uses the Reuters survey to proxy for the market expectations and
finds that the oil inventory shocks move oil futures prices but have limited influence on volatility.
Ye and Karali (2016) analyze the impact of both the EIA and API inventory announcements on
crude oil futures returns and volatility. The EIA announcements shocks are measured relative to
the API actual, whereas the API shocks measured relative to the Thomson Reuters survey. Their
results show that both the EIA and API inventory shocks have a significant effect on returns and
volatility. However, the effect of the API inventory shocks is smaller and shorter-lived compared
to the effect of the EIA inventory news.
Armstrong, Cardella, and Sabah (2017) study the impact of the EIA oil inventory surprises
on crude oil futures liquidity. They find that these shocks resolve uncertainty and increase
liquidity. Chang, Daouk, and Wang (2009) investigate the impact of analyst forecast accuracy on
the oil markets. They find that investors are able to identify good analysts and respond to their
forecasts. Ederington et al. (2019) analyze the properties of analyst forecasts of oil and natural gas
inventories. They find that the reaction of the daily price of oil and natural gas futures to the EIA

15

Examples of studies in this area include Andersen et al., (2003), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007),
Baum, Kurov, and Halova (2015), Rigobon and Sack (2004), Scholtus, van Dijk, and Frijns (2014).
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announcements is influenced by the level of forecast dispersion. Additionally, they find that
inventory forecasts for natural gas are more accurate compared to those for oil.
Halova, Kurov, and Kucher (2014) employ the identification through censoring technique
to correct for biases in the estimates of the responses of energy futures markets to inventory news.
They find that the bias in the OLS estimates is quite large. Linn and Zhu (2004) analyze the impact
of the weekly gas inventory announcements on the volatility of the natural gas futures. They find
that the announcements cause a significant increase in volatility in the 30-minute interval after the
release. Other studies examine the impact of OPEC announcements (Karali and Ramirez, 2014;
Kutan and Demirer, 2010; Schmidbauer and Rösch, 2012; Spencer and Bredin, 2019).
To measure inventory news, it is important to choose an appropriate proxy for market
expectations. We employ the relative importance method to construct a combination forecast
which could accurately represent the market expectations. This methodology has been employed
in different contexts to assess the relative importance of multiple variables (Grömping, 2006;
Johnson and Lebreton, 2004; Thomas et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, the only prior
study that uses combination forecasts to compute inventory surprises is Anatolyev, Seleznev, and
Selezneva (2018). Our approach differs from theirs in that we do not impose any assumptions in
allocating the weights. Furthermore, our approach is easily generalized to incorporate more than
two forecasts. This approach to measuring market expectations can be used in other contexts such
as macroeconomic and corporate announcements.
2.3. Institutional Background, Data, and Variables
Our empirical analysis centers around two major weekly oil announcements. These two
announcements provide a unique setting because they contain similar information and are released
on consecutive days. One of these announcements is released by the EIA. Oil companies and
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refineries are required to participate in the weekly EIA survey and provide accurate information
about their oil inventory by the end of each Friday.16 The EIA compiles this information and
prepares the Weekly Petroleum Status Report. The report is usually released on Wednesdays at
10:30 am ET. Market participants and policymakers closely follow these releases and use them to
analyze changes in the oil supply and demand.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) was established by Congress and the domestic oil
and gas industry in 1919. The institute has around 625 corporate members, and it is considered
one of the largest associations in the oil and gas industry.17 The API releases its oil inventory report
at 4:30 pm ET every Tuesday. These releases are reported by the traditional news media, social
media and other media platforms (Armstrong, Cardella, and Sabah 2017). As mentioned above,
prior research finds that the API oil inventory announcements have significant effects on oil prices
and volatility (Ye and Karali, 2016). The API and the EIA provide similar information, and both
are considered highly reliable. Furthermore, both EIA and API collect data from almost the same
respondents and cover around 90% of the U.S. oil and gas industry. According to API, “API
collects an exact copy of the data submitted to EIA. Respondents send data to API using the same
weekly survey forms that EIA uses.”
Our sample period spans from January 2011 to August 2019.18 This sample period provides
sufficient data to conduct our analysis and ensure that our results are not driven by a particular
market regime. Due to holidays, EIA announcements occasionally take place on Thursdays instead
of Wednesdays. In such cases, the time interval between the API and the EIA announcements may
exceed 18 hours. In our main analysis, we exclude those EIA announcements that took place on

The EIA information is provided on the EIA’s website at https://www.eia.gov/.
The API information is available on the API’s website at https://www.api.org/.
18
The sample period is chosen based on availability of the API actual data.
16
17
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Thursdays.19 The resulting sample contains 385 EIA oil inventory announcements.
We use data for the nearby WTI oil futures contracts, since they are very liquid (Chiang
and Hughen, 2017). These futures are considered to be very efficient in incorporating public
information. We use intraday data, which allows us to analyze trading activity and price behavior
around the EIA and API inventory announcements. We use the oil futures data to construct the
illiquidity measure following Amihud (2002). This illiquidity measure is defined as follows:
|𝑟𝑑,𝑠 |
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 = (
)
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑠

(1)

where 𝑟𝑑,𝑠 is the absolute return and 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑠 is the volume on day 𝑑 in period 𝑠. This measure is
widely used in the literature (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009).20
Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) use the Google Search Volume Index (SVI) and find that
an increase in SVI can predict stock returns up to two weeks in advance. Oil attention has been
shown to have significant predictive power for oil prices at both daily and weekly frequencies
(Han, Lv, and Yin, 2017). We measure attention to oil prices using daily Google SVI data. We use
the search activity for “oil” as our measure of attention to oil prices. We select the following search
categories to capture attention to the oil market (1) Business & Industrial, (2) Energy & Utilities,
(3) Oil & Gas.21 Moreover, we download the consensus forecasts for the EIA announcements from
Bloomberg. We also download the U.S. oil inventory level from the EIA website.
We construct the combination forecast according to the weights estimated by the relative
importance analysis. This method is proposed by Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1981),
henceforth LMG. Figure 1 shows the annual weights allocated to the API actuals computed based

19

Our results remain significant and very similar if these announcements are included in the sample.
The Amihud measure has been shown to have the largest correlation with liquidity benchmarks in commodity
markets (Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti, 2012).
21
We have used several variations of search categories to ensure the robustness of our attention measure.
20
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on relative importance regression using data for the previous year. We can see that the API actual
receives weights of more than 50% throughout our sample period. Table 1 provides summary
statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The table shows that the means of both API
actual and Bloomberg consensus are below the mean of the EIA actual. In addition, the mean of
the surprises that are computed based on the combination forecast falls between the means of the
surprises computed based on Bloomberg consensus and API actual.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
2.4. Results and Discussion
As mentioned above, we use the sequence of two very similar U.S. oil inventory announcements
to examine the informational efficiency of energy markets. In this section, we discuss our results
and relate them to the existing literature. Rousse and Sévi (2019) find a significant drift in the
“correct” direction before the EIA oil inventory announcements. They attribute this drift
potentially to leaked news. Gu and Kurov (2018) ascribe a similar drift before the EIA natural gas
inventory announcements to superior forecasting. Consistent with these studies, Figure 2 shows a
price drift in the oil futures before the EIA oil inventory announcements. Below, we provide
evidence that processing mere public information explains much of this preannouncement drift.
Figure 3 shows no evidence of statistically significant drift prior to the API oil inventory
announcements, which is consistent with the API oil inventory surprises being less predictable
compared to the EIA inventory news.22
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 Here]

22

We use the Thomson Reuters survey as a proxy for market expectations for the API announcements because the
results of this survey are usually released at about 2 pm ET on the announcement days (Ye and Karali, 2016). The
cumulative average returns are very similar when we use the Bloomberg consensus as a proxy for market expectations.
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2.4.1. Predicting Returns Before the EIA Inventory Announcements
We begin by testing whether the information contained in the API inventory announcements is
efficiently incorporated in oil futures prices. The efficient market hypothesis posits that prices
reflect all public information. Therefore, earlier returns should not predict subsequent returns.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the 30-minute return of oil futures post-API release predicts the 60minute return of oil futures prior to the EIA oil inventory announcements.23 We find almost the
same significant predictability of the oil futures returns in other time intervals before the EIA oil
inventory announcements such as 30 and 90 minutes before the announcement.24 Figure 4 uses
Welch and Goyal (2008) methodology to show significant out-of-sample predictive power of the
post-API oil futures returns over the pre-EIA returns.25 These findings present an apparent
violation of weak-form market efficiency.26 The information in the API announcements is not fully
incorporated in the price immediately, perhaps because some traders delay trading on this
information until right before the EIA announcement.27
A plausible explanation for the delayed incorporation of information released by the API
could be attributed to the unique setting of our study. API oil inventory announcements are known
to provide reliable estimates of the U.S. oil inventory level. However, the EIA announcements are
more widely recognized and followed compared to the API announcements. Furthermore, WTI
crude oil futures have a one-hour trading break starting at 5:00 pm ET, and when trading resumes
at 6:00 pm the market liquidity is relatively low. These factors may contribute to delayed

23

We choose 30-minute return of oil futures after the API announcement because these announcements are released
at 4:30 pm ET and WTI oil futures do not trade from 5:00 pm to 6:00 pm ET.
24
We use the 60-minutes interval before the EIA announcements to conduct our main analysis because it represents a
midpoint between the other alternatives.
25
An explanation of the Welch and Goyal (2008) method is provided in the Appendix.
26
In a weak-form efficient market, past market data cannot be used to forecast future returns.
27
We find no evidence of significant asymmetry in the predictability of the pre-EIA oil futures return. Specifically,
the difference between positive post-API oil futures return and negative post-API oil futures return in predicting preEIA oil futures return is not statistically significant.
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incorporation of information in the API oil inventory announcements.
The Bloomberg consensus forecast of oil inventory changes is publicly available before
the inventory announcements. However, this forecast is almost never updated after the API
announcements. Since this forecast does not reflect the API oil inventory news, it is not an up-todate measure of market expectations at the time of the EIA oil inventory announcements. Hence,
we construct a simple predictor computed as the difference between the API actual and the
Bloomberg median consensus. The predictor represents a forecast of the surprise of the EIA oil
inventory announcements, if one uses the widely followed Bloomberg consensus as a proxy for
market expectations. Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 5 show that the predictor can predict the oil
futures returns before the EIA announcements both in-sample and out-of-sample. These results
provide further evidence of market inefficiencies as the predictor is based on public information.28
[Insert Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5 Here]
2.4.2. Predictability of Inventory Surprises
We further analyze whether the EIA inventory surprises can be predicted using the post-API oil
futures return and our predictor. Following previous studies (e.g., Halova, Kurov, and Kucher,
2014), we compute the oil inventory surprises as the difference between the EIA actual and the
Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of inventory. Table 3 shows that both the postAPI oil future return and the predictor can predict the oil inventory surprises. Hence, the EIA oil
inventory surprises are highly predictable by using public information, probably due to the fact
that the Bloomberg forecasts of the EIA oil inventory changes are rarely updated after the API
inventory releases. To address the potential autocorrelation in the EIA inventory surprises, we have

28

As part of our robustness checks, we split the sample in two equal sub-samples and repeated the entire analysis of
Table 2. The results in both subsamples are similar to those reported in the paper.
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included the lags of the surprises.29 Table 3 shows that this leaves our results essentially unchanged.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
2.4.3. Market Conditions and Return Predictability
Elaborating on our primary findings under different market conditions, Table 4 provides the results
of our analysis during times with different levels of liquidity and oil attention. Liquidity plays a
vital role in market efficiency. Green (2004) shows that price discovery surrounding the release of
public announcements occurs through trading. Therefore, information will be incorporated into
prices faster when the market is more liquid. Several recent studies show that sophisticated trading,
such as high-frequency and algorithmic trading, enhances price discovery and liquidity (Brogaard
et al., 2014; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013). Accordingly, we expect that as liquidity increases in the
market, predictability driven by market inefficiencies decreases. Consistent with this view, in
Table 4, our results indicate that the predictive power of the post-API oil futures return for the preEIA oil return is significant only when the liquidity in the oil futures market is low.
Investor attention influences the efficiency of processing public information. Barber and
Odean (2008) find that investors are more likely to purchase stocks that catch their attention.
Vozlyublennaia (2014) and Dimpfl and Jank (2016), show a significant relation between investor
attention measured by Google SVI and volatility in financial markets. Fink and Johann (2014)
relate investor attention to different aspects of markets microstructure. They find that trading by
all types of traders increases during high-attention days. Regression estimates in Table 4 show that
return predictability before the EIA announcements is statistically significant only during periods
of low attention. This indicates that the market processes the API inventory news faster when

29

The optimal numbers of lags were determined using the Akaike information criterion.
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traders pay attention to oil. 30
[Insert Table 4 Here]
2.4.4. Return Predictability for Energy Stocks
We also examine if a similar market inefficiency is present in energy stocks. Oil is a primary
production input for energy firms. Therefore, changes in oil prices represent important
fundamental information for energy companies. The regression estimates in Table 5 show that the
30-minute post-API crude oil futures return can be used to predict the returns of oil companies
from the CRSP database on the day of the EIA oil inventory announcements.31 This suggests that
opening prices of energy stocks do not fully incorporate information about oil inventory released
after the previous stock market close.
We also use intraday data for the NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index to examine how long it
takes for energy stocks to incorporate information contained in the API oil inventory
announcements. Table 5 shows that energy stocks incorporate this information within the first ten
minutes of the stock market opening. This predictability is no longer significant after the first ten
minutes of trading. Our findings support the view that oil has predictive ability for stock returns.
In addition, the 30-minute post-EIA oil futures return has no significant predictive power over the
NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index return during the time interval from 11:00 am until the stock
market close.32 Therefore, energy stocks seem to be efficiently incorporating oil-related
fundamental information during the trading hours.
[Insert Table 5 Here]

30

The correlation between the liquidity and oil attention measures in our sample is approximately 0.10. This low
correlation indicates that these two market conditions are different from each other.
31
We identify oil companies using the following SIC codes: 1300, 1310-1319, 1320-1329, 1330-1339, 1370-1379,
1380-1382, 1389, 2900-2912, 2990-2999, 3533, 4612-4613, 5171-5172, 6792.
32
These results are not tabulated for brevity but are available upon request.
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2.4.5. Combination Forecast
We want to explore how the choice of a proxy for market expectations influences the estimated
impact of the EIA oil inventory surprises on the oil futures returns. Table 6 shows that when using
the Bloomberg consensus forecast as the market expectations proxy yields an estimated OLS
response coefficient of -0.24 and an R2 of 9%. In contrast, computing the EIA oil inventory
surprises as the difference between the EIA and API actual announced values produces an
estimated market response coefficient of -0.42 and an R2 of 18%.33 This validates the importance
of using the information released by the API in measuring market expectations prior to the EIA
announcements.
As mentioned above, the Bloomberg consensus forecast does not capture changes in market
expectations after the API inventory announcements. However, this does not rule out the
possibility that the Bloomberg consensus forecast contains information not captured by the API
actual. Regression estimates in Table 7 show that both the Bloomberg median forecast and the API
actual are useful predictors of the weekly EIA inventory change. Therefore, we employ a relative
importance method to construct a combination forecast of the EIA oil inventory announcements
by objectively allocating weights to the Bloomberg consensus forecast and the API actual.
Grömping (2006) provides a discussion of this approach. The LMG method decomposes the R2 of
a multivariate regression into non-negative contributions of each independent variable.
Furthermore, the LMG technique overcomes the potential problem that the contribution of each
regressor depends on the order in which the regressors are added to the model. The LMG method
achieves this by using simple averaging over all the possible orderings of the regressors. To
describe the LMG approach, we use the same notations and steps as in Grömping (2006). For a set

33

To compute the surprises, we scale the unexpected inventory changes by the level of inventory as in Halova, Kurov
and Kucher (2014).
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S that consist of all regressors in the model, the R2 can be expressed as:
𝑅 2 (𝑆) =

𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑆𝑆 (𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑆)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑆

(2)

Once we add an additional regressor that is in set M to the previous set S, the additional R2 can
be computed as follows:
𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅 2 (𝑀|𝑆) = 𝑅 2 (𝑀 ∪ 𝑆) − 𝑅 2 (𝑆)

(3)

The number of possible orderings is the permutation of the chosen regressors 𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑝 which are
denoted by the tuple of indices 𝑟 = (𝑟1 , … , 𝑟𝑝 ). The model is assumed to include multiple
regressors, 𝑆𝑘 (𝑟), before the regressor 𝑥𝑘 . The part of the R2 allocated to the regressor 𝑥𝑘 can be
formulated as:
𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅 2 ({𝑥𝑘 }|𝑆𝑘 (𝑟)) = 𝑅 2 ({𝑥𝑘 } ∪ 𝑆𝑘 (𝑟)) − 𝑅 2 (𝑆𝑘 (𝑟))

(4)

Finally, from equation (3) we can get the LMG metric as follows:
LMG (𝑥𝑘 ) =

1
𝑝!

∑𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅 2 ({𝑥𝑘 }|𝑟)

(5)

Table 6 shows that using the combination forecast as a proxy for market expectations
increases the R2 of the energy announcement impact on oil futures return by approximately 130%
compared to the Bloomberg median consensus, and by approximately 17% compared to the API
actual. Hence, using the combination forecast to compute the oil inventory surprises reduces
measurement errors that could stem from the use of a single proxy for market expectations. 34 To
analyze the effect of such measurement errors of the estimated market response coefficients, we
conduct an analysis using the Identification Through Censoring (ITC) technique proposed by
Rigobon and Sack (2008).35 Regressors are often measured with error. It is well known that this

34

We have explored other proxies for market expectations including the Bloomberg top-ranked analyst forecast. We
used the Bloomberg consensus in weeks with missing top-ranked analyst forecast. The results are almost the same as
those obtained using the Bloomberg consensus to measure market expectations before the EIA announcements.
35
A more detailed description of the identification-through-censoring (ITC) technique is provided in the Appendix.
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measurement error induces a downward bias in the regression coefficients estimated with common
techniques. The ITC methodology adjusts for such attenuation bias. Measurement errors in oil
inventory surprises are driven by two factors. First, any proxy for expectations that does not
incorporate all available information. Second, the EIA surveys do not cover the entire population
of oil companies.
The ITC estimates of the market response coefficients are reported in Table 6. For all three
measures of market expectations, the ITC estimates are close to -2. These estimates are much larger
in absolute value than the corresponding OLS and robust regression estimates reported in the same
table. These estimates are also about twice as large as the ITC estimate of the oil futures market
response to crude oil inventory news reported in Halova, Kurov, and Kucher (2014). The larger
ITC coefficient estimates in our study could reflect the rising importance of the U.S. in the energy
markets. Due to the increased production of shale oil, the U.S. has become one of the largest oil
producers in the world. Table 6 also shows that when we use the combination forecast as a measure
of market expectations, the OLS estimate of the market response coefficient is closer to the
estimates produced by the ITC technique compared to the OLS estimates based on either the
Bloomberg median consensus or the API actual. Although the estimated proportion of the
measured inventory surprise due to noise is quite large for all three measures of market
expectations, it is smaller for the surprise based on the combination forecast compared to the
surprises based on the other two expectation proxies. These results provide evidence that using the
combination forecast to compute oil inventory surprises reduces measurement errors that stem
from the use of a single stale proxy for market expectations.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 Here]

52

2.4.6. Economic Significance
To examine if oil futures return predictability before the EIA oil inventory announcements can be
used for profitable trading, we propose a simple trading strategy based on our predictor, computed
as the difference between the API actual announced value of inventory change and the Bloomberg
consensus forecast. The strategy involves selling (buying) oil futures contracts 60 minutes before
the EIA announcements and closing the position 1 minute before the EIA announcement if the
predictor is positive (negative). Table 8 shows that this trading strategy generates an approximate
annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.67 in the full sample, and an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.1 when the
predictor has large values.36 We assume traders would open a futures position 60 minutes before
the EIA announcements to be consistent with the other analyses in our study. Table 8 shows that
this trading strategy generates substantial Sharpe ratios if it involves establishing a position 90 or
120 minutes before the EIA announcements.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
2.5. Conclusion
This paper uses sequential energy announcements to examine how futures and equity markets
process information. We find that the oil futures return after the weekly inventory releases by the
American Petroleum Institute (API) predicts the oil futures return before the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) announcements on the following day. This predictability is
statistically significant during periods of low liquidity and low attention to oil. Additionally, we
find that the API actual and Bloomberg consensus forecasts are both useful in forecasting the
change in oil inventory released by the EIA. We construct a predictor computed as the difference
between the API actual and the Bloomberg median consensus. The predictor has significant

36

The large values of the predictor are those in the top and bottom deciles.
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explanatory power for oil futures returns before the EIA announcements both in-sample and outof-sample. A simple trading strategy using large values of the predictor to generate trading signals
would generate an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.1.
We develop a combination forecast based on the API actual and the Bloomberg median
consensus to forecast the EIA oil announcements. The combination forecast increases the R2 of the
regression of oil futures returns on energy surprises by approximately 130% compared to the
Bloomberg median consensus used in prior studies. Overall, our results show that asset prices do
not instantaneously reflect new public information even in the case of widely anticipated scheduled
announcements. Our results are useful for traders. Policymakers tasked with facilitating efficient
price discovery in energy futures markets may also benefit from our study. For example, our results
suggest that public announcements are more likely to be incorporated immediately into asset prices
if they are released during regular trading hours. Furthermore, more media coverage of these
releases would increase investor attention, which would facilitate quicker incorporation of new
information into the prices.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The EIA actual,
API actual, combination forecast, and Bloomberg median consensus are in thousands of barrels.
The predictor is computed as the difference between the API Actual and the Bloomberg median
consensus divided by the level of inventory. The combination forecast is computed as the weighted
average of the Bloomberg median consensus and the API actual, with the weights computed using
the relative importance methodology described in Section 4. Post-API Return is the oil futures
return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. SurpriseBloomberg is the oil inventory surprise
computed based on the Bloomberg consensus, SurpriseAPI is the oil inventory surprise computed
based on the API actual. SurpriseCombination is the oil inventory surprise computed based on the
combination forecast. The inventory surprises are expressed in percentage and computed as the
difference between the EIA actual and the corresponding market expectations proxy divided by
the inventory level. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and contains 385
announcements.
Variable

N

Mean

St. Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

EIA Actual
API Actual
Predictor
Combination Forecast
Post-API Return
Bloomberg Median Consensus
SurpriseBloomberg
SurpriseAPI
SurpriseCombination

385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385

307.81
191.11
-0.01
199.38
0.003
178.74
0.025
0.031
0.026

4588.46
4614.72
1.02
3703.36
0.51
2256.5
0.98
0.76
0.70

-12788
-12400
-3.34
-9560.56
-2.36
-4261
-2.80
-1.99
-2.31

14400
14200
2.86
13116.67
2.01
2240
2.75
2.06
1.88
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Table 2: In-sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns
𝐴𝑃𝐼
Panel A reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the oil
𝐴𝑃𝐼
futures return from 60 min before to 1 min before the EIA announcement and 𝑅𝑡−1
is the oil
futures return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. Panel B reports estimates for the
following model: 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑃𝑡 is computed as the difference between the API
Actual and the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of inventory. Panel C reports
𝐴𝑃𝐼
the estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 . The sample period is from
January 2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 announcements. The regressions are estimated
using (1) OLS with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix and (2) Yohai
(1987) MM weighted least squares procedure robust to outliers. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Panel A
Slope
Intercept
R2
Panel B
Slope
Intercept
R2
Panel C
Post-API Return
Predictor
Intercept
R2

Post-API Return
OLS
0.17***
(0.04)
0.002
(0.02)
0.04

Robust Regression
0.14***
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.02
Predictor

OLS
-0.06***
(0.023)
-0.0002
(0.02)
0.02
OLS
0.16***
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.0001
(0.02)
0.04

Robust Regression
-0.05**
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.01
Post-API Return and Predictor
Robust Regression
0.13**
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.02
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Table 3: Predictability of Oil Inventory Surprises
𝐴𝑃𝐼
Panel A reports the estimates for the following model: 𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑡−1
+ ∑𝐿𝑛=1 𝛽𝑛 𝑆𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
𝐴𝑃𝐼
where 𝑆𝑡 is the EIA oil inventory surprise for day t and 𝑅𝑡−1 is the return of the oil future contracts
in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. Panel B reports the estimates for the following
model: 𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑡 + ∑𝐿𝑛=1 𝛽𝑛 𝑆𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑃𝑡 is computed as the difference between the
API Actual and the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of inventory. 𝑆𝑡 is computed
as the difference between the EIA oil inventory change and Bloomberg median consensus divided
by the level of inventory. The optimal number of lags was determined using the Akaike
information criterion. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and contains 385
announcements. The regressions are estimated using OLS with the White (1980)
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A
Intercept

Post-API Return
R2
Panel B
Intercept

Predictor
R2

Without Lags of Surprise
0.03
(0.04)
-0.92***
(0.09)
0.23
Without Lags of Surprise
0.03
(0.035)
0.68***
(0.03)
0.51
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L=1
0.02
(0.04)
-0.95***
(0.09)
0.24
L=2
0.03
(0.035)
0.69***
(0.035)
0.51

Table 4: Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Return under Different Market Conditions
𝐴𝑃𝐼
This table reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 where 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the
𝐴𝑃𝐼
oil futures return from 60 min before to 1 min before the EIA announcement, 𝑅𝑡−1
is the oil
futures return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. We split the sample into high and
low for each of the following market conditions: liquidity and SVI oil attention. High is defined
as above the median and low is defined as below the median. The sample period is from January
2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 announcements. The regressions are estimated using OLS
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Post-API Return
Intercept
R2

Liquidity
Low
High
***
0.20
0.10
(0.07)
(0.07)
0.01
-0.01
(0.04)
(0.03)
0.05

0.01

58

Oil Attention
Low
High
***
0.22
0.10
(0.05)
(0.086)
-0.01
0.03
(0.02)
(0.05)
0.06

0.01

Table 5: Predicting Returns of Energy Stocks
𝐴𝑃𝐼
The first column reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑡𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 is
the full day return of all oil companies in the CRSP database on the days of the EIA announcements and
𝐴𝑃𝐼
𝑅𝑡−1
is the oil futures return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. The second and third columns
𝐴𝑃𝐼
report estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑡𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸 is the return of the
NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index on the days of the EIA announcements in the specified time window.
The sample period for the estimation in the first column is from January 2011 to December 2018 and
contains 354 announcements. The sample period for the estimations in columns 2 and 3 is from January
2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 announcements. The regressions are estimated using OLS with
the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

CRSP Oil Companies
Time Interval

Open – Close

NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index
9:30 am – 9:40 am

***

9:40 am – Close

Slope

0.28
(0.01)

0.13***
(0.04)

0.13
(0.11)

Intercept

-0.09***
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.03
(0.056)

R2

0.01

0.026

0.003
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Table 6: Response of Oil Futures Prices to Oil Inventory Announcements
This table reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑡 is the oil
futures return from 5 minutes before to 10 minutes after the EIA announcement and 𝑆𝑡 is the oil
inventory surprise. The inventory surprise is computed as the difference between the EIA actual
and a market expectation proxy, divided by the inventory level. The Bloomberg consensus
forecast, the API actual, and the combination forecast are used to proxy for market expectations in
columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. The combination forecast is computed using the relative
importance method proposed by Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1981). The inventory surprises
are expressed in percentage terms. The regressions are estimated using (1) OLS with the White
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix and (2) Yohai (1987) MM weighted least
squares procedure robust to outliers and (3) the identification-through-censoring (ITC) technique
proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2008). The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019
and contains 385 announcements. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

(1)
Bloomberg
Slope

-0.24***
(0.04)

𝑅2

0.09

Slope
𝑅2
Slope
Pseudo-𝑅 2
Proportion of measured
surprise due to noise

(2)
API
OLS
-0.42***
(0.05)
0.18

(3)
Combination Forecast
-0.49***
(0.05)
0.21

Robust Regression
-0.16
-0.25***
-0.31***
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.06
0.08
0.11
Identification-Through-Censoring (ITC)
-2.03***
-1.89***
-1.89***
(0.43)
(0.24)
(0.26)
0.97
0.95
0.94
***

88%

78%

60

74%

Table 7: Predicting the EIA Announcements using the Bloomberg Consensus and API Actual
This table reports estimates for the following model 𝐸𝐼𝐴 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝐶 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑃 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
where EIA actual is the weekly released EIA oil inventory change, BC is the Bloomberg median
consensus, and AP is the API actual. The regressions are estimated using (1) OLS with the White
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix and (2) Yohai (1987) MM weighted least
squares procedure robust to outliers. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and
contains 385 announcements. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Intercept (𝛼)
BC (𝛽1 )
AP (𝛽2 )
𝑅2

OLS
0.11
(0.13)
0.38***
(0.07)
0.69***
(0.03)
0.65

Robust Regression
-0.037
(0.14)
0.43***
(0.07)
0.69***
(0.04)
0.50
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Table 8: Performance of Trading Strategy based on Predictor
This table reports the annualized Sharpe ratio of the following trading strategy: selling (buying)
oil futures contracts 60 or 90 or 120 minutes before the EIA announcements and closing the
position 1 minute before the EIA announcement if the predictor is positive (negative). The
predictor is computed as the API Actual minus the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the
level of inventory. The large values of the predictor are defined as the upper and lower deciles.
The Sharpe ratio is computed by dividing the sample mean return by the sample standard deviation.
The annualized Sharpe ratio is computed based on per-event Sharpe ratio times the square root of
the average number of events per year. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019
and contains 385 announcements.
Window

Full Sample (N=385)

Large Values (N=77)

(-60 min, -1 min)
(-90 min, -1 min)
(-120 min, -1 min)

0.67
0.62
0.54

2.1
1.05
1.19
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Figure 1: Weights Allocated to the API Actual in the Combination Forecast
This figure shows the weights allocated to API actuals in constructing the combination forecast
based on the relative importance method proposed by Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1981) and
estimated separately for each year. The remaining weight in the combination forecast is allocated
to the Bloomberg consensus forecast. The period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and
contains 385 announcements.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Average Return of Oil Futures before EIA Oil Announcements
This figure shows the cumulative average return (CAR) of the nearby oil futures contract around
the releases of the weekly Oil Storage Report. In order to aggregate CARs for positive and negative
surprises, we invert the sign of returns for positive surprises as in Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016).
The inventory surprise is computed as the difference between the EIA actual and the Bloomberg
median consensus, divided by the inventory level. Only observations with inventory surprises in
the top and bottom deciles are used. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and
contains 77 announcements.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Average Return of Oil Futures before API Oil Announcements
This figure shows the cumulative average return (CAR) of the nearby oil futures contract around
the releases of the weekly American Petroleum Institute (API). In order to aggregate CARs for
positive and negative surprises, we invert the sign of returns for positive surprises as in Bernile,
Hu, and Tang (2016). The inventory surprise is computed as the difference between the API actual
and the Thomson Reuters survey, divided by the inventory level. Only observations with inventory
surprises in the top and bottom deciles are used. The sample period is from January 2011 to August
2019 and contains 77 announcements.
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Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns using Post-API Oil
Futures Returns
This figure plots out-of-sample (OOS) performance of a weekly predictive regression using the
methodology proposed by (Welch and Goyal 2008b). Particularly, these are the cumulative
squared predictions errors of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction errors of the
𝐴𝑃𝐼
alternative. The alternative model is 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the oil futures return
𝐴𝑃𝐼
from 60 minutes before to 1 minute before the EIA announcement, 𝑅𝑡−1
is the oil futures return
in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. The sample period is from January 2010 to August
2019 and contains 385 announcements. The NULL uses the recursively estimated mean of the preEIA oil futures return. An increasing line indicates better performance of the alternative model. A
decreasing line indicates better performance of the NULL. The blue band represents the equivalent
of a 95% confidence interval and is constructed according to the MSE-T critical values from
McCracken (2007).
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Figure 5: Out-of-Sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns using the Predictor
This figure plots out-of-sample (OOS) performance of a weekly predictive regression using the
methodology proposed by (Welch and Goyal 2008b). Particularly, these are the cumulative
squared predictions errors of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction errors of the
alternative. The alternative model is 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑡𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the oil futures return
from 60 minutes before to 1 minute before the EIA announcement, and 𝑃𝑡 is computed as the
difference between the API Actual and the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of
inventory. The sample period is from January 2010 to August 2019 and contains 385
announcements. The NULL uses the recursively estimated mean of the pre-EIA oil futures return.
An increasing line indicates better performance of the alternative model. A decreasing line
indicates better performance of the NULL. The blue band represents the equivalent of a 95%
confidence interval and is constructed according to the MSE-T critical values from McCracken
(2007).
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Appendix A: Essay 2
I.

Identification-Through-Censoring

In a part of our analysis, we use the identification-through-censoring (ITC) technique proposed by
Rigobon and Sack (2008). The ITC technique is employed to adjust for the bias that stems from
measurement error in the inventory surprises. The measurement error could be due to two reasons.
First, our measures of market expectations are imperfect, as they do not incorporate all relevant
information available at the time of the announcement. Second, the actual released value of the
inventory change is not precise, since it does not cover the entire population of oil companies.37
We use several proxies for market expectations, which helps to shed some light on the sources of
measurement error in the inventory surprises. The effect of inventory news on oil futures can be
estimated using the following simple regression model:38
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾𝑧𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
(A.1)
𝑧𝑡 = ∆𝐼𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝜏 [∆𝐼𝑡 ]
where 𝑅𝑡 is the oil futures return computed in the specific intraday window around the
announcement, 𝑧𝑡 is the inventory surprise calculated as the difference between the actual change
of inventory level, ∆𝐼𝑡 , and the proxy for the market expectations of that inventory change,
𝐸𝑡−𝜏 [∆𝐼𝑡 ]. As mentioned above, 𝑧𝑡 is measured with error. Therefore, it can be represented as:
𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡∗ + 𝛿𝑡 ,

(A.2)

where 𝛿𝑡 is the measurement error and 𝑧𝑡∗ is the “true” inventory surprise. In a regular OLS
estimation, the impact of inventory surprises on returns is represented as follows:

37

The EIA oil inventory survey usually covers about 90% of the population of oil companies, which leaves about 10%
not surveyed. This may cause some noise in the estimates of the change in oil inventory. This issue is discussed at
https://www.api.org/products-and-services/statistics/api-weekly-statistical-bulletin.
38
For a more detailed discussion of the ITC technique in the context of energy inventory announcements, see Halova
et al. (2014).
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𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾𝑧𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 ,
(A.3)
𝑣𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 − 𝛾𝛿𝑡 .
However, the coefficient 𝛾 is biased since the regressor is correlated with error term. We
can express the OLS estimate of the response coefficient as:
𝛾̂𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝛾 (1 −

𝜎𝛿2
2
𝜎𝑧∗ + 𝜎𝛿2

).

(A.4)

This means that the OLS estimator is biased downwards. Rigobon and Sack (2008) argue
that dealing with the measurement error bias presents an identification problem. They suggest this
problem can be solved by noting that the measurement error is “censored” in periods with no
announcements. In such periods both the “true” inventory surprise 𝑧𝑡∗ and the measurement error
𝛿𝑡 are zero. Using returns in the same intraday interval on the day before the announcement, 𝑅𝑡−1,
the model parameters can be estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) based
on the following set of moment conditions:
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡−1 ) = 𝜎𝜀2 ,
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡 ) = 𝛾 2 𝜎𝑧2∗ + 𝜎𝜀2 ,
(A.5)

𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑧𝑡 ) = 𝜎𝑧2∗ + 𝜎𝛿2 ,
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡 ) = 𝛾 2 𝜎𝑧2∗ .

Solving these equations produces the following estimator of the market response
coefficient:

𝛾=

𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡 )−𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡−1 )
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡 ,𝑧𝑡 )

.

(A.6)

For returns on non-announcement days, we use the same intraday interval (from 10:25 am
to 10:40 am) as the interval used to measure the returns around the announcement.
We compute the following pseudo-𝑅 2 statistic to compare the explanatory power of the
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ITC estimation with that of the OLS:
pseudo-𝑅 2 = 1 −

𝜎𝜀2
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡 )

(A.7)

Intuitively, the pseudo-𝑅 2 captures the fraction of return variance described by the model.
We estimate the variance of the structural shocks 𝜀𝑡 using non-announcement returns. Therefore,
equation (A.7) assumes that inventory surprises fully explain the post-announcement increase in
the variance of returns.
II.

Out-of-Sample Forecasting

Several studies show that the predictors that seem to perform well in-sample may lose their
predictive power out-of-sample (e.g., Welch and Goyal 2008). Hence, we conduct an out-ofsample predictability analysis for our main empirical findings. We use the same methodology as
in Welch and Goyal (2008). The benchmark model (Null) is the recursively estimated mean of the
pre-EIA oil futures return. Subsequently, we compare the benchmark model with the following
alternative predictive regression:
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡

(A.8)

where 𝑋𝑡−1 is either the post-API oil futures return or the predictor, which is computed as the
difference between the API actual and the Bloomberg consensus forecast divided by the level of
inventory. The performance of the predictive regression is evaluated by computing the difference
between the cumulative squared predictions errors of the Null and the cumulative squared
prediction errors of the Alternative. If this difference is positive, it means the Alternative performs
better than the Null, and if it is negative it means the Null has better predictive ability than the
Alternative.
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Essay 3. The Impact of Oil Shocks on Sovereign Default Risk*

3.1. Introduction
The significant influence of oil on the performance of domestic and global markets is well
documented in the literature (see, for e.g., Nandha and Faff, 2008; Ready, 2018; Sim and Zhou,
2015; You, Guo, Zhu and Tang, 2017). Hamilton (2008) finds that the price of oil is one of the
essential factors that triggered each recession since World War II. In a similar vein, Kilian and
Park (2009); Kilian (2008, 2009); and Ready (2018), show the substantial impact of both oil supply
and demand shocks on several economies and financial markets. Governments usually try to offset
the influence of oil shocks using multiple channels, such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, trading
policies, among others (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; Kilian and Lewis, 2011). However, the
solvency of these governments could be adversely affected, which raises concerns about their debt
default risk (Chuffart and Hooper, 2019; Shahzad, Naifar, Hammoudeh, and Roubaud, 2017). In
this paper, we investigate the impact of daily oil shocks on changes in the spreads of sovereign
credit default swaps (CDS).
There are several ways in which the price of oil can affect economies, and in particular the
solvency of governments. For oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, the solvency of
governments could be mainly influenced through changes in their current and future potential tax
revenue, and through changes in the perception of their solvency risk. In the case of oil-importing

*

This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Ann Marie Hibbert.
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countries, oil shocks affect governments’ tax revenue through several channels. Volatility and
changes in the price of oil have pronounced effects on the cost of production and inflation, which
in turn, influences governments' tax revenue as taxable income for both firms and individuals is
affected (Cologni and Manera, 2008; Thoresen, 1982). Moreover, an increase in oil price can
adversely impact the productivity of firms, and the potential output at any given level of capital
for countries (Cunado and Perez De Gracia, 2005). Additionally, fluctuation in oil prices may
increase economic uncertainty, leading to a decrease in irreversible corporate investments and
foreign direct investments, which will potentially impact governments' tax revenue (Clark, 1996).
In the case of oil-exporting countries, changes in oil prices will have a substantial impact on export
revenues, fiscal balances, and government expenditure (Chuffart and Hooper, 2019). Hence, the
sustainability of public finances and the financial soundness of oil exporters would change with
oil shocks, which in turn affect the cost of insuring against default on sovereign debt. Finally, one
would expect the perception of solvency risk to be altered for both oil-importing and oil-exporting
countries since oil shocks have a significant impact on economies and financial markets (Kilian
and Park, 2009; Kilian, 2009; Ready, 2018).
Our main objective is to comprehensively analyze the impact of oil shocks on the perceived
default risk of major oil-exporting and importing countries. Ready (2018) proposes a model to
classify oil shocks. One benefit of this classification system is that it allows us to disentangle the
oil supply and demand shocks at a higher frequency (daily) than was previously possible. We
employ this classification and investigate the respective impact of supply and demand shocks on
sovereign default risk, as proxied by changes in their CDS spreads. We hypothesize that how each
type of shock affects a country’s default risk will depend on whether the country is a major oil
importer or exporter. For example, a demand shock would most likely have a direct impact on the
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economies of oil exporters but an indirect impact, (i.e via prices) on the economies of major oil
importers. Conversely, a supply shock would more likely have an immediate (delayed) impact on
net oil exporters (importers).
In line with our main hypothesis, we first investigate the impact of oil supply and demand
shocks on changes in the sovereign CDS spreads of (i) major oil-importing countries as proxied
by a sample of G10 countries, and (ii) a sample of major oil-exporting countries. Since prior studies
find that the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads vary across the conditional distribution of
spread changes (Hibbert and Pavlova, 2017; Shahzad, Naifar, Hammoudeh, and Roubaud, 2017),
we also investigate whether the impact of oil shocks varies across the quantiles of spread changes.
A number of prior studies have documented nonlinear impacts of oil prices on stock markets
and economies (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; Zhu, Su, You and Ren, 2017; Uddin, Rahman,
Shahzad and Rehman, 2018). Our second goal is to investigate whether the impact of oil supply
and demand shocks varies with the state of the economy. We first use a two-state Markov regime
switching modeling to test whether there are non-linearities in the relation between oil shocks and
changes in sovereign CDS spreads. We also investigate whether global economic conditions or a
country’s dependence on oil influences the relation between oil shocks and changes in sovereign
CDS spreads.
We make at least four important contributions to the literature that investigates the factors that
affect changes in sovereign CDS spreads. First, we provide robust evidence that oil supply and
demand shocks have a significant impact on changes in the CDS spread of both the G10 countries
as well as major oil-exporting countries. Our second contribution is to show how demand and
supply shocks affect changes in spreads across the entire distribution of CDS changes using a
quantile regression model. For both the G10 and oil-exporting countries, we find that demand
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shocks affect spreads across all quantiles of the CDS changes. However, supply shocks affect
spreads in only some quantiles. In the case of the G10 countries, the impact of supply shocks is
more important in the extreme quantiles only while in the case of the oil-exporting countries,
supply shocks are important in both the middle and upper quantiles. These findings are consistent
with prior studies that report significant variation in the impact of some global factors across the
distribution of sovereign CDS spreads.
Our findings present a different picture than previous literature as we focus on the underlying
causes of oil movements; oil supply and demand shocks (Da Fonseca, Ignatieva and Ziveyi, 2016;
Wegener, Basse, Kunze, and Mettenheim, 2016). The differential impact of these shocks on each
of our samples underlines the importance of identifying the source of changes in the price of oil,
as well as the need to acknowledge the heterogeneity in the response of net oil-importers viz-a-viz
oil-exporters.
Results of our bi-variate Markov regime switching modeling show that demand shocks
have a significant impact in both high and low volatility states for the G10 countries and oilexporting countries. However, the magnitude of the impact of demand shocks is almost ten times
higher during the more volatile state. On the other hand, supply shocks have a significant impact
only in the high volatility state for the G10 countries and oil-exporting countries. We also find that
the cumulative impact of oil shocks, as well as the standard deviations are statistically different
across the two states for both the G10 and oil-exporting countries. These results support the
importance of considering the nonlinearity assumption when examining the effect of oil shocks on
sovereign CDS. We also show that the impact of oil shocks on CDS spreads varies with the level
of global economic activity as proxied by an index of world industrial production (see Hamilton,
2019). We find that both supply and demand shocks significantly affect CDS spread changes for
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the G10 countries in low levels of global economic activity, but neither shock has an impact during
periods of high global economic activity. For oil-exporting countries, supply shocks only
significantly lower CDS spreads during high levels of global economic activity, whereas demand
shocks only affect spreads during low levels of global economic activity.
Finally, we show that the impact of oil shocks on spread changes depends on how reliant
the country is on oil. Specifically, we find that the magnitude of the impact of oil shocks on changes
in CDS spreads is stronger for the G10 countries that are more reliant on imported oil. Similarly,
we find that supply shocks only significantly impact spreads for oil-exporting countries that are
heavily reliant on oil revenue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief review of related
literature and outlines our main research questions, Section 3.3 discusses the data, variable
construction and provides univariate statistics, Section 3.4 describes our methodology, Section 3.5
provides the empirical results and discussions, and Section 3.6 presents our conclusions.
3.2. Related Literature and Research Questions
There are two main strands of literature that are relevant to our study; first, there are those studies
that investigate the relative importance of global versus domestic factors in explaining changes in
sovereign CDS spreads, and the second are those studies that investigate the role of oil prices in
explaining CDS spreads. We provide a brief review of each of these strands.
3.2.1. Sovereign CDS Spreads: Global vs. Domestic Factors
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), one of the most widely cited papers in this area;
study sovereign CDS for 26 different countries. They find that compared to country-specific
factors, global market factors are more important in determining sovereign credit risk. In addition,
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by decomposing the spreads for each country into risk-premium and default-risk components, they
show that global factors have a more significant influence on default-risk components relative to
the risk-premium component. In a similar vein, Pan and Singleton (2008) use CDS data for
Mexico, Turkey and Korea and find a significant correlation between risk premiums and economic
measures of global risk.
Several other studies support the significant influence of global factors on CDS spreads
based on different regions, time periods, and empirical methodologies. For example, Augustin and
T´edongap (2016) find that global macroeconomic factors significantly impact the full term
structure of a geographically dispersed panel of 38 countries. Similarly, Dooley and Hutchison
(2009) show that several financial and real economic news originating from the U.S. during the
2007 financial crisis significantly affect sovereign CDS spreads in a sample of 14 emerging
markets, and Oliveira, Curto and Nunes (2012) find that domestic factors greatly influence Eurodenominated government bonds before the financial crisis, but global factors dominate during and
after the crisis period. Furthermore, Wang and Moore (2012) employ a dynamic conditional
correlation from a multivariate GARCH model to show that the correlation between sovereign
CDS spreads in 38 developed and emerging countries are greatly driven by U.S. economic
conditions. Fender, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012) also find that emerging markets’ sovereign CDS
are primarily driven by global and regional risk premia, and not by country-specific risk factors.
These influences, by global and regional risk premia, are more pronounced during periods of
economic stress than under ordinary periods.
There are other studies, however, that indicate the importance of domestic factors in
determining sovereign CDS spreads. Ang and Longstaff (2013) find that local financial market
factors influence the systematic risk of sovereign CDS for both the U.S. and Eurozone countries.
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In addition, Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) analyze sovereign CDS spreads of 31 advanced and
emerging economies during the European sovereign debt crisis. Their results show that, compared
to global factors, country-specific and regional factors have more significant explanatory power.
Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes (2012) conduct an event study to show that European Union sovereign
bond yield and CDS spreads significantly respond to negative rating changes and outlook.
Recently, Eichler (2014) shed light on the role of political factors in determining sovereign bond
yield in 27 emerging markets during the period between 1996 and 2009. Their findings show that
elections and the degree of democracy have limited influence on sovereign bond yield, whereas
governance quality and parliamentary systems substantially affect sovereign bond yield.
3.2.2. Oil as a Global Factor
There is a body of literature that analyzes the interaction between oil and CDS. More closely
related to our study are those that investigate the impact of oil on sovereign CDS spreads. An
example is that of Chuffart and Hooper (2019), who use a Time-Varying Transition Probabilities
Markov Switching model to analyze the impact of oil price and volatility on the CDS of Russia
and Venezuela. They find that oil return has a significant impact on the CDS spread of Venezuela
only during turbulent economic periods. In addition, they show that oil return significantly
influences the CDS of Russia in all regimes (but) only before adding global factors.
A few studies have made the distinction between oil-exporters versus oil-importers. For
example, Naifar, Shahzad, and Hammoudeh (2017) show that oil price volatility more significantly
affects sovereign CDS spreads of oil-rich countries than other major global regions such as the G7,
BRICS, Council of Europe (CE), Asia, and North America (NA). Pavlova, Boyrie, and Parhizgari
(2018) investigate the dynamic spillover of crude oil prices and volatilities on sovereign CDS
spreads for oil-exporting countries. Their findings suggest that the spillover effects of the oil
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market to sovereign CDS spreads, changes over time and is only significant for some countries.
Similarly, Wegener, Basse, Kunze, and von Mettenheim (2016) use a VAR-GARCH model and
find that positive oil price shocks lower the CDS spreads of Brazil, Malaysia, Norway, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Venezuela. In terms
of predictability, the empirical findings of Shahzad, Naifar, Hammoudeh and Roubaud (2017)
posit that oil volatility predicts sovereign CDS in different quantiles for the GCC and the other oilexporting countries.39
Unlike prior studies, we are the first to conduct a robust analysis of the impact of daily oil
supply and demand shocks on the sovereign CDS spreads of major oil-exporting and oil-importing
countries. Specifically, our four main hypotheses are:
H1: Oil supply and demand shocks affect daily changes in the sovereign CDS spreads of oilimporting and oil-exporting countries.
H2: The impact of oil supply and demand shocks varies across the conditional distribution of sovereign
spread changes.

H3: The relation between oil supply and demand shocks and sovereign spread changes is statedependent.
H4: The relation between oil supply and demand shocks and sovereign spread changes varies with the
country’s dependence on oil.

39

Some studies also investigate the impact of oil on corporate CDS spreads. See for example, Guo, Chen, and Huang
(2011); Lahiani, Hammoudeh, and Gupta (2016); and Dai and Serletis (2018).
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3.3. Data, Variable Construction and Univariate Statistics
3.3.1. Sovereign CDS
Sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) are financial contracts providing insurance for investors
whendebt issuers default on their outstanding debts. Buyers of these contracts pay a premium in
order to receive a contingent payment, which becomes due if the contractually stated event
materializes (Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton, 2011). These premiums are usually quoted
in basis points per notional value of the contracts. Each CDS has five main contractual features:
(1) the debt issuer (e.g., sovereign entities in our study), (2) the outlined obligations, (3) the term
of the contract, (4) a specified value for the notional principal, and (5) the potential events that
prompt contingent payments. To investigate the impact of oil supply and demand shocks on
sovereign default risk, we use the CDS of a sample of G10 countries and four major oil-exporting
countries. The G10 countries included in our sample are the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.40 The oilexporting countries included in our sample are Russia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and
Kazakhstan. These countries are selected based on two criteria: (1) they are among the largest oilexporting countries,41 and (2) Bloomberg provides data on their five-year CDS spreads.
Appendix A provides the level of government debt for each of the countries in our sample,
for the period from 2009 to 2018. In Panel A, we report the summary statistics of the level of
government debt in billions of U.S. dollars. The U.S. and Japan have the highest mean sovereign
debt of approximately 1.76 and 1.1 trillion dollars, respectively. In order to put the level of

40

We do not include Canada as its CDS data is available only from the end of 2017.
More information on the size of the oil exports for these countries is at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2242rank.html.
41
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government debt into perspective, we report the percentage of debt to GDP in Panel B. Japan has
the highest mean percentage of debt to GDP of 226.86%, followed by 125.52% for Italy.
[Insert Panels A and B of Appendix A Here]
We use the 5-year CDS for each of the countries in our sample as they are among the most
liquid sovereign CDS. The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10
countries, and from February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries. The start of
the sample period is based on the availability of the data in Bloomberg. The sovereign CDS spreads
are highly sensitive to changes in the solvency of countries. For instance, Greece faced substantial
financial difficulty, which resulted in Greece missing its scheduled 1.55 billion euro payment on
June 30, 2015. The 5-year sovereign CDS spread of Greece skyrocketed approximately five-fold
from 1443.51 basis points on June 29, to 6739.21 basis points on June 30 (See Figure 1).
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Figure 2 plots the evolution in spreads for each country in our sample. There is a spike in
the CDS of most of the European countries between 2011 and 2012. This is approximately the
time of the European debt crisis. In addition, there is a spike for both Russia and Iraq around the
year 2015, which is just after the plunge of oil prices.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
3.3.2. Oil Shocks Data and Variable Construction
We follow Ready (2018) in constructing the oil shocks and so we use the same data. In order to
construct the oil shocks, we need three variables: (1) daily prices of the one-month NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil contract from the EIA website, (2) the World Integrated Oil and Gas
Producer Index from Thomson Reuters Database, and (3) the CBOE volatility index (VIX) from
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the CBOE website. The simple intuition behind this approach is that oil-producing firms are
affected by demand shocks but have a natural hedge against supply shocks. A supply disruption
that causes an oil price increase would offset the negative impact of the decrease of oil supply.
According to this setup, demand shocks are defined as “the portion of contemporaneous returns of
a global index of oil-producing firms which is orthogonal to unexpected changes in the log of the
VIX index” (Ready, 2018). In addition, supply shocks are defined as “the portion of
contemporaneous oil price changes which is orthogonal to demand shocks as well as to innovations
in the VIX” (Ready, 2018).
We use similar notation as in Ready (2018) to explain the method to construct the shocks.
As mentioned before, this approach classifies oil shocks into supply, demand, and risk shocks by
decomposing the change in oil prices. Supply shocks, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡 , demand shocks, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡 and
risk shocks 𝑣𝑡 are assumed to be orthogonal and defined as follows:
∆𝑝𝑡
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡
1 1
𝑋𝑡 = ⌈𝑅𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 ⌉, 𝑍𝑡 = ⌈𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡 ⌉, A ≡ ⌈0 𝑎22
0 0
𝑣𝑡
𝜁𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡

1
𝑎23 ⌉
𝑎33

(1)

The identified shocks in matrix A are mapped into observable variables as follows:
𝑋𝑡 = 𝐴𝑍𝑡

(2)

To achieve the objective of imposing orthogonality, we satisfy:

−1 ∑

𝐴

𝑋

(𝐴−1 )𝑇

= [

2
𝜎𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦

0

0

0
0

2
𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
0

0]
𝜎𝑣2

(3)

𝛴𝑋 represents the covariance matrix of the observable 𝑋𝑡 , and 𝜎𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 , 𝜎𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 , 𝜎𝑣 are the
volatilities of the identified shocks. This procedure can be considered a simple renormalization of
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the standard orthogonalization that is employed to define the structural shocks in a SVAR
framework. In addition, we aggregate the shocks to sum up to the total change in the oil price.
3.3.3. Other Variables
Our choice of control variables is motivated by prior studies, discussed in Section 2 (Chuffart and
Hooper 2019; Hibbert and Pavlova 2017; Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton, 2011). The
control variables can be categorized into two groups. The first group includes two domestic
variables: (1) St. Return is the daily return for each country’s stock market, and (2) FX Rate is the
change in the exchange rate for each country’s currency against the U.S. dollar. Appendix B list
the respective index that we use for each country’s stock market. In the case of the U.S., we use
the Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar index, which is “a weighted average of the foreign exchange value
of the U.S. dollar against a subset of the broad index currencies”42. The second group consists of
variables intended to capture global factors. These include: the change in the TED spread
(∆TedRate) the change in the CBOE volatility index (ΔVIX), the S&P 500 index return (S&P500),
the change in the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility index (ΔV2X), the change in the German 10-year Bond
yield (ΔGerman Bond), the change in the effective Federal Fund rate (ΔFedFund), the change in
the European Repo rate (ΔEuro Repo), and the change in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield
(ΔTreasury).43 The data for all control variables is from Bloomberg.
To measure global economic activity, we use the monthly industrial production index for
the OECD and six other major countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation,
and South Africa).44 Hamilton (2019) highlights the superiority of this index compared to other

42

More information on the index is at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website.
We take first differences for all the variables other than the returns variables as they have a unit root based on the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
44
The data is from Professor James Hamilton’s website: https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~jhamilton/#publications.
Baumeister and Hamilton (2019) extend the original index to the present.
43
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alternative indexes of real economic activity. To measure each country’s oil dependency, for the
G10 countries, we use the ratio of energy imports to total domestic energy; a higher ratio indicates
a higher dependency. We use the ratio of oil rents to GDP to differentiate between high and low
oil revenue dependency for the oil-exporting countries. The data for the two proxies of the
country’s oil dependency is from the World Bank database.
3.3.4. Univariate Statistics
In Panels A and B of Table 1, we report summary statistics for the daily sovereign CDS spread
changes over our sample period. We provide results for the G10 countries in Panel A, and in Panel
B, we provide similar analysis for the oil-exporting countries. For the G10 countries, we see that
Italy experiences the highest average spread change, while Sweden has the lowest. Among the oilexporting countries, Iraq has the highest mean change in spreads, whereas UAE has the lowest.
Comparing the results in Panel A to those in Panel B shows that the spread change of the oilexporting countries are largely more volatile than those of the G10 countries. In Panel C of Table
1, we report summary statistics for the control variables used in our multivariate analyses discussed
in Section 4. All of our data series are well behaved, with values similar to those reported in prior
studies.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
We report the correlation between all the countries’ CDS spread changes in Panel A of
Table 2. The correlation between spread changes for countries in the same region is relatively high.
For instance, the correlation between the CDS of Germany and France is 0.79, and that between
the Netherlands and Belgium is 0.69, with both being highly statistically significant. In Panel B
we report the correlation between all our control variables. The correlation between almost all the
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control variables is moderately low. Furthermore, the correlation between the oil shocks and all
the control variables is very low.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
3.4. Methodology
3.4.1. Main Regression Model
We start our baseline analysis by using the following regression model to test our first hypothesis
𝑚

𝑛

∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑗 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3,𝑗 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑗=1

𝑗=1

𝛾𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(4)

where ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the daily change in spreads of countries denoted by i over days denoted by t,
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 is the one-day lagged change in spreads, included to allow for any autocorrelation in
spread changes, 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 is the set of domestic control variables denoted by j for each
country denoted by i, and 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is the set of global control variables denoted by j, described
in Section 3.3. Our main variables of interest are 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1, the one-day lagged shock to the
demand side of oil, and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 , the one-day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both
constructed based on Ready’s (2018) method described briefly in Section 3.2. We estimate the
model in (4) using both pooled ordinary least squares as well as a panel regression model separately
for the sample of G10 countries and for the oil-exporting countries. We report standard errors that
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country level to account for serial dependency
for the panel regression model with country and year fixed effects to control for heterogeneity
across countries and years, respectively.
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3.4.2. Quantile Regressions
To test our second hypothesis, we follow Koenker (2004) who develops the panel data model for
quantile regression. Koenker (2004) starts the model with a classical linear random-effects model:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

(5)

In our context, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the daily change in the CDS spread, t is the daily observation for each country
i, and 𝛼𝑖 is intended to represent unobserved heterogeneity across countries that is not captured by
the control variables in the model. The conditional quantile functions of the response of the ith
country in day t is given by:
𝑄𝑦𝑖𝑡 (𝑞|𝑥𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽(𝑞)

(6)

According to this formula, the conditional quantiles for the dependent variable are affected by the
pure location shift 𝛼𝑖 . The effects of 𝛼𝑖 are not allowed to depend on the quantile of interest, q,
however the covariates 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are allowed to. The model in expression (6) can be estimated
simultaneously for several quantiles by solving the following model:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑝
∑
∑𝑛 ∑𝑇 𝑤 𝜌 (𝑦 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝑗 𝛽 (𝑞𝑘 ))
(𝛼, 𝛽) 𝑘 = 1 𝑖=1 𝑡=1 𝑘 𝑞𝑘 𝑖𝑡

(7)

where 𝜌𝑞 (𝑢) = 𝑢(𝑘 − 𝐼(𝑢 < 0)) represents the piecewise linear quantile loss function of
Koenker and Bassett (1978). According to Koenker (2004), equation (7) can be iteratively solved
by a sequence of diagonally weighted least squares steps using Cholesky factorization. Expression
(7) can be rearranged to present the panelized version as:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑝
∑
∑𝑛 ∑𝑇 𝑤 𝜌 (𝑦 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝑗 𝛽 (𝑞𝑘 )) + 𝜆 ∑𝑛𝑖=1⌊𝛼𝑖 ⌋
(𝛼, 𝛽) 𝑘 = 1 𝑖=1 𝑡=1 𝑘 𝑞𝑘 𝑖𝑡
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(8)

Based on Koenker (2004), we get an estimate of the model purged of the fixed effects as λ →
∞ the 𝛼̂𝑖 → 0.
3.4.3. Markov Switching
To test our third hypothesis, whether the impact of supply and demand shocks on sovereign CDS
is state-dependent, we develop a Markov-switching panel model. Asea and Blomberg (1998) is
one of the first papers that employ the Markov-switching panel model. Their approach was later
extended by several other papers such as Cermeño (2002), Chen (2007), and Zhu et al. (2017). We
follow Zhu et al. (2017) since they conduct a very similar analysis to ours. Starting with the model
in expression (4), we construct the bivariate Markov-switching panel model as:
𝑚

𝑛

∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖,𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑗 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3,𝑗 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑗=1

𝑗=1

𝛾𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(9)

Specifically, our aim is to allow the impact of 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1, and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 to be dependent on the
regime 𝑆𝑡 at time t. This state-dependent impact is captured by the coefficients, γst and δst .
The transition probability matrix for St , which is an unobservable two-regime Markov
process, is given by:
𝑝11
P = (𝑝
12

𝑝21
𝑝22 )

(10)

where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = p (𝑆𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑖), with ∑2𝑗=1 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1 for regime i (i = 1,2). We also assume that the
regime switching process follows a first-order Markov chain. We estimate the model with two
states, state-dependent regression oil shocks’ coefficients, and state-dependent volatility for the
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error process. Specifically, the Markov-switching model is estimated using student t distribution
as it improves the stability of the regimes.
To measure the accuracy and fit of the Markov-switching model, we follow Ang and
Bekaert (2002) and compute the regime classification measure (RCM):
RCM = 100 𝑆 2

1
𝑇

∑𝑇𝑡=1 ∏𝑆𝑗=1 𝑃̃
𝑗,𝑡

(11)

RCM is the average of the product smooth probabilities p, and S is the number of states. The RCM
ranges between 0 and 100, where 0 indicates that the Markov-Switching model perfectly classifies
regimes and 100 indicates the model’s failure to classify regimes. Hence, low RCM values are
better than high RCM values.
3.5. Results and Discussion
3.5.1. The Impact of Oil Shocks on Sovereign CDS Spreads
In this section, we discuss the results of our empirical tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. We start with a
discussion of the results for the model in Equation (4). Table 3 provides results separately for the
G10 countries and the major oil-exporting countries. We find consistent results between the pooled
OLS regression model and the panel model with fixed effects for both groups of countries.45 For
the G10 countries, demand shocks significantly lower the spreads of the sovereign CDS. A positive
demand shock leads to a decrease in spreads of about 0.12 basis points. These results are consistent
with the view that positive demand shocks are indicators of healthy economies (Kilian, 2009;
Ready, 2018). Thus, we find generally that demand-driven movements of oil prices lower the
sovereign default credit risk of oil-importing countries. Conversely, supply shocks increase the

45

In unreported results, we estimate a panel regression model without fixed effects. Also, we estimate a panel
regression model without control variables other than the oil supply and demand shocks. The results, available upon
request, are consistent with those reported.

87

spreads of the G10 CDS. A one unit positive supply shock results in a significant 0.04 basis points
increase in spreads. Supply shocks cause an almost immediate increase in uncertainty regarding
oil supply, which increases spreads of G10 countries.46
The results for the major oil-exporting countries show that both oil supply and demand
shocks lower the spreads of the sovereign CDS for the oil-exporting countries. The finding that a
demand shock causes a decrease in spreads for oil exporters is intuitive since an increase in demand
for oil is good news for oil exporters. Similarly, a supply shock, consistent with a decrease would
likely lead to an increase in prices and would have a favorable impact on the economies of oil
exporters, resulting in lower spreads. Thus, both shocks mainly convey good news for those
countries.47
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Table 4 reports estimates of the quantile regression model for the G10 countries and the
major oil-exporting countries. The low quantile indicates low default risk, whereas the upper
quantile indicates a high default risk. In Panel A of Table 4, we find that demand shocks affect
spreads across all the quantiles for the G10 countries. However, supply shocks have a relatively
limited influence in the middle quantile of the spreads. Hence, the supply-driven oil movements
mostly affect spreads at the tails of default risk. These findings are consistent with the literature
that shows a significant impact of oil during turbulent periods of sovereign debt (Chuffart and
Hooper, 2019). The results for the oil-exporting countries, reported in Panel B of Table 4 show

46

In unreported results, we estimate a panel regression without Italy, in the case of G10 countries, as the standard
deviation of its CDS spread is large compared to that for other countries (see Table 1). We also estimate a panel
regression without the U.S. as its dependence on imported oil has been changing. The results, available upon request,
are consistent with those reported.
47
In unreported results, we estimate a panel regression without Iraq, in the case of oil-exporting countries, as the
standard deviation of its CDS spread is quite large compared to that for other countries (see Table 1). The results,
available upon request, are consistent with those reported.
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that demand shocks have a significant effect across the entire conditional distribution of spread
changes, but the supply shocks mostly impact the upper quantiles. These results indicate that
supply shocks mainly impact spreads when the default risk is high. However, supply shocks seem
to have a limited effect on the left tail of the distribution of spread changes, i.e. when there is low
default risk.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Together the results so far provide evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically,
both oil supply and demand shocks affect changes in spreads of the G10 countries and major oilexporting countries. CDS spreads decrease due to oil demand shocks for both the G10 countries
and oil-exporting countries. In contrast, oil supply shocks increase the spreads of the G10
countries, but reduce the spreads of oil-exporting countries. Furthermore, the effect varies across
the conditional distribution of spread changes for these countries.
3.5.2. Regime Switching Model and Other Tests
The nonlinearity of oil prices and shocks have been the subject of extensive discussions in the
energy literature (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; Zhu, Su, You and Ren, 2017; Uddin, Rahman,
Shahzad and Rehman, 2018). In this section, we first investigate whether the impact of oil shocks
that we report in the previous sub-section is state-dependent, i.e. we test our third hypothesis. State
1 is the low volatility state and State 2 is the high volatility state, as measured by the variance in
each respective state. We confirm (in unreported results) that the cumulative impact of oil shocks
and the states’ standard deviations (sigmas) are different between the two states. In addition, the
RCM values for both the G10 countries and oil-exporting countries, reported in Table 5, confirm
that the model fits the data very well. Figure 3 graphs the smoothed probabilities of the high
volatility state for each group of countries. For most of our sample period, the probability of
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spreads being in the high volatility state is largely consistent with major world events.
Furthermore, the probability of spreads being in high or low volatility states for each group of
countries is very similar. An exception is the period from around 2015-2016 when only the spreads
of the oil-exporting countries were largely in a high volatility state.
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 3 Here]
Table 6 provides results for the bivariate Markov-Switching model given in equation 9.
For both the G10 countries and oil-exporting countries, demand shocks have a significant influence
on spreads in both high and low volatility states, while supply shocks impact spreads only in the
more volatile state. Furthermore, both demand and supply shocks have a larger impact on spreads
in the more volatile state. For instance, a positive demand shock leads to a significant 0.07 basis
point decrease in spreads of the G10 countries in the low volatility state whereas it leads to a
significant 0.66 basis point decrease in spreads in the highly volatile state. The results in Table 6
also show that within each state, the magnitude of the impact of both supply and demand shocks
is significantly greater for the oil-exporting countries compared to the G10 countries. Together
these results are in support of our third hypothesis that the impact of oil shocks on sovereign spread
changes is state-dependent.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
We also examine the influence of economic conditions and the countries’ oil dependence
on the relation between oil shocks and changes in spreads. In Table 7, we show that oil shocks
have a significant influence on spreads only during low economic activity periods. These results
indicate that the G10 countries are more prone to the effect of oil shocks during times of economic
downturns. On the other hand, we find that supply shocks lower the spreads of oil-exporting
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countries only during high economic activity. The demand for oil would be elevated during periods
of high global economic activity, thus, a disruption in oil supply would likely result in a significant
increase in oil price which potentially has positive consequences for oil exporters. We find that
demand shocks lower the spreads of oil-exporting countries only during periods of low economic
activity. When the global economy slows down, oil exporters most likely will be negatively
affected. Hence, an increase in the oil price due to demand shocks during these adverse periods
would deliver good news for oil exporters as they likely need additional revenue.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
Finally, we analyze the influence of the countries’ oil dependency on the relation between
oil shocks and changes in sovereign spreads. We use the ratio of energy imports to total domestic
energy use to differentiate between high and low oil imports dependency for the G10 countries.
The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that the magnitude of the influence of oil shocks on spreads
is greater for countries that are highly dependent on imported oil. These results are of great
importance for policymakers, institutions and portfolio managers in the G10 countries. The debate
regarding the reliance on imported and conventional oil may benefit from the results of this study.
For oil-exporting countries, we use the ratio of oil rents to GDP, to differentiate between high and
low oil revenue dependency. The results for the oil-exporting countries in Panel B of Table 8 show
that supply shocks affect only countries that are heavily reliant on oil revenue.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
3.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effect of oil shocks on sovereign CDS spreads. Our sample of
countries consists of the G10 countries and major oil-exporting countries. Using the recently
developed classification of oil shocks by Ready (2018), we provide robust evidence that oil
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demand shocks lower the spreads of the sovereign CDS for both the G10 countries and the oilexporting countries, with the effect of oil demand shocks being significant across all quantiles for
both groups of countries. On the other hand, oil supply shocks increase the spreads of the G10
countries, but lower the spreads of oil-exporting countries, with the impact concentrating in the
upper quantiles of spreads. We also test for nonlinearity by employing two-state Markov-switching
modeling and find the significant influence of oil shocks mostly concentrates in a highly volatile
state. In addition, the impact of oil shocks on the changes of CDS spreads is sensitive to the global
economic conditions and to the country’s dependence on oil.
Our results are beneficial for governments, corporations, and international organizations.
The sensitivity of the sovereign CDS spreads to oil shocks underlines the importance of designing
and structuring hedging strategies against this type of risk. Governments may benefit from the
results in this study as they consider their reliance and exposure to oil shocks Moreover, our study
underscores the importance of assessing the nonlinearity between sovereign CDS and global
determinants such as oil shocks.
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Appendix A: Essay 3
I.

Summary Statistics of each Country’s Sovereign Debt

The level of each country’s government debt is from the World Bank database and the percentage
of debt to GDP is from the IMF database. The sample period is from 2009 – 2018.
Panel A – Government Debt in Billion of USD
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Russia
UAE

N
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Mean
518.2
2,479.4
2,679.7
2,587.2
11,870.0
523.5
213.2
282.7
2,237.0
17,600.9
91.1
27.1
232.9
66.8

Std. Dev.
31.6
177.0
254.5
149.3
1,242.9
50.6
22.9
21.8
333.7
2,862.0
17.0
9.1
60.8
6.7

Min
482.1
2,232.9
2,408.0
2,411.3
10,166.0
473.3
175.9
238.8
1,525.5
12,527.2
74.1
11.8
121.0
61.0

Max
570.6
2,733.1
2,994.9
2,836.0
14,205.4
605.9
258.5
304.9
2,640.2
21,375.4
113.8
40.4
331.7
79.1

Panel B – Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Russia
UAE

N
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Mean
103.7
92.5
73.8
125.5
226.9
61.5
40.4
42.7
82.6
101.6
51.1
15.3
13.6
19.0

Std. Dev.
2.8
5.6
6.9
7.9
12.7
5.3
2.6
1.0
7.7
6.2
17.2
4.9
2.5
2.7
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Min
99.5
83.0
61.7
112.5
201.0
52.4
37.2
40.5
63.7
86.7
32.0
10.2
9.9
15.5

Max
107.5
98.4
82.3
132.2
237.1
68.0
45.0
44.1
87.9
106.8
87.4
21.9
16.4
24.1

Appendix B: Essay 3
I.

Stock Exchanges

This table reports the stock exchanges used to compute the domestic stock market return variable
(St. Return) in our analyses.
Country
USA
UK
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
Russia
Iraq
UAE
Kazakhstan

Stock Exchange
Dow Jones
FTSE 100
CAC 40
DAX
FTSE MIB
Nikkei 225
BEL 20
AEX
OMX Stockholm 30
Swiss Market Index
MXRU Russia stock
Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX)
Abu Dhabi Securities Market General Index
Kazakhstan Stock Exchange Index KASE

94

Table 1: Summary Statistics of CDS Spread Changes
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analyses. Panels A and B summarize
the daily CDS spread change for the G10 countries and the major oil-exporting countries, respectively,
and Panel C summarizes the control variables. Spreads are reported in basis points. St. Return is the
daily return for each country’s stock market, FX Rate is the exchange rate for each country against the U.S.
dollar. TedRate is the TED spread, VIX is the CBOE volatility index, Oil Realized Volatility is the square
root of the sum of squared five-minute returns of oil futures prices. V2X is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility
index, Oil price is the one-month price of oil future contract, Demand is a shock to the demand side of oil,
Supply is a shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed based on Ready’s (2018) method.
S&P500 is the S&P 500 index return, German Bond is the German 10-year Bond yield, FedFund is the
effective Federal Fund rate, Euro. Repo is the daily rate of the European Repo, Treasury is the 10-year U.S.
Treasury yield. A list of the countries’ stock market is provided in Appendix A. The sample period is
from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018
for the major oil-exporting countries. The oil-exporting countries are Russia, Iraq, UAE, and
Kazakhstan.

Panel A – Daily Change of CDS Spread for G10 Countries
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
24,754
-0.004
3.68
All
2,476
-0.010
4.59
Belgium
2,476
0.002
3.16
France
2,476
-0.007
1.54
Germany
2,476
0.051
9.27
Italy
2,476
-0.009
1.97
Japan
2,476
-0.012
1.78
Netherlands
2,476
-0.018
1.22
Sweden
2,470
-0.020
1.75
Switzerland
2,476
-0.012
1.61
UK
2,476
-0.005
1.26
USA
Panel B – Daily Change of CDS Spread for Oil-Exporting Countries
Mean
Std. Dev.
N
All
8,180
0.017
10.02
Iraq
2,059
0.079
16.93
Kazakhstan
2,059
-0.039
6.46
Russia
1,981
0.037
8.27
UAE
2,059
-0.016
2.18
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Min
-72.50
-57.52
-30.28
-14.50
-72.50
-17.36
-14.41
-7.76
-17.06
-17.92
-10.47

Min
-105.09
-105.09
-51.41
-88.41
-14.84

Max
109.00
37.14
23.30
11.13
109.00
19.28
15.44
8.69
43.73
13.66
12.47

Max
304.78
304.78
51.31
66.96
13.79

Table 1: (Continued)
Panel C – Control Variables
Mean

N
St. Return
ΔFX Rate
ΔTedRate
ΔVIX
ΔV2X
Demand
Supply
S&P500 Return
ΔGerman Bond
ΔFedFund
ΔEuro. Repo
ΔTreasury

24,165
24,747
24,330
24,700
24,299
24,700
24,700

0.023
0.001
0.000
0.000
-0.015
0.000
-0.001
0.045
-0.001
0.430
0.460
2.490

24,720
24,760
24,760
24,660
24,760
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Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1.278
0.188
0.015
1.593
1.640
0.972
1.575
0.924
0.043
0.001
0.000

-13.923
-3.940
-0.080
-12.940
-10.937
-5.764
-7.742
-6.663
-0.257
0.023
0.013

12.195
3.300
0.090
20.010
12.783
3.949
8.236
4.741
0.229
-0.150
-0.250

0.000

0.049

-0.200

Table 2: Correlation Between the Main Variables
Panel A reports the correlation between changes in the 5-year sovereign CDS spread for each of the countries in our sample and Panel
B reports the correlation between the explanatory variables used in the analyses. St. Return is the daily return for each country’s stock
market (described in Appendix A), FX Rate is the exchange rate for each country’s currency against the U.S. dollar. TedRate is the TED
spread, VIX is the CBOE volatility index, S&P500 is the S&P 500 index return, V2X is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility index, German
Bond is the German 10-year Bond yield, FedFund is the effective Federal Fund rate, Euro. Repo is the daily European Repo rate,
Treasury is the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. Demand is a shock to the demand side of oil, and Supply is a shock to the supply side of
oil, both shocks constructed based on Ready’s (2018) method. Correlations in bold are significant at the 5% level or higher.The sample
period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries.
Panel A – The Correlation Between Daily Changes in Sovereign CDS Spreads
USA

UK

France Germany

Italy

Japan

Belgium

Netherlands

Sweden Switzerland Russia

Iraq

UK

0.23

France
Germany
Italy

0.21
0.22
0.17

0.65
0.69
0.55

0.79
0.70

0.59

Japan
Belgium
Netherlands

0.13
0.22
0.21

0.34
0.64
0.6

0.33
0.80
0.71

0.37
0.74
0.72

0.31
0.70
0.58

0.31
0.34

0.69

Sweden

0.23

0.52

0.56

0.57

0.45

0.28

0.56

0.57

Switzerland
Russia

0.08
0.13

0.40
0.34

0.35
0.35

0.39
0.35

0.25
0.36

0.26
0.35

0.36
0.33

0.38
0.32

0.31
0.25

0.17

Iraq
UAE

0.02
0.14

0.08
0.29

0.09
0.28

0.07
0.32

0.09
0.28

0.11
0.35

0.07
0.29

0.05
0.29

0.06
0.22

0.03
0.19

0.13
0.40

0.09

Kazakhstan

0.14

0.37

0.38

0.40

0.36

0.36

0.38

0.37

0.29

0.19

0.65

0.12
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UAE

0.43

Table 2: (Continued)

Panel B – The Correlation Between the Explanatory Variables Used in the Analyses
St. Return

FX Rate

TedRate

VIX

V2X

S&P
500

German
Bond

FedFund

Euro.
Repo

Treasury

ΔFX Rate

-0.050

ΔTedRate

-0.030

-0.024

ΔVIX

-0.460

-0.080

0.004

ΔV2X

-0.620

-0.075

0.001

0.570

S&P500 Return

0.570

0.082

-0.029

-0.830

-0.540

ΔGerman Bond

0.390

0.072

-0.040

-0.280

-0.380

0.350

ΔFedFund

-0.024

0.004

0.049

0.014

0.004

-0.020

0.010

ΔEuro. Repo

0.010

-0.001

-0.008

-0.010

0.010

0.020

0.030

-0.001

ΔTreasury

0.310

0.145

-0.070

-0.360

-0.340

0.440

0.630

0.020

0.020

Demand

0.020

0.010

0.030

-0.020

0.050

0.030

0.001

-0.023

-0.030

0.030

Supply

0.010

-0.010

-0.020

0.010

-0.010

0.000

0.020

0.030

0.010

0.010
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Demand

0.000

Table 3: Pooled and Panel Regressions
This table reports the estimates for a pooled OLS regression model and a panel regression model with
fixed effects of the following model:
𝑚

𝑛

∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑗 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3,𝑗 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +
𝑗=1

𝑗=1

𝛾𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
ΔCDSi,t is the daily change in sovereign CDS spread of countries denoted by i over days denoted by
t, and ΔCDSi,t-1 is the one day lagged change in spreads. DOMESTICj,i,,t is the two control variables
included for each country: the daily return on each country’s stock market (St. Return), and the daily
change in the exchange rate of each country’s currency against the U.S. dollar (ΔFX Rate). GLOBALj,t
is the set of global control variables: the daily change in the CBOE volatility index (ΔVIX ), the daily
S&P 500 index return (S&P500 Return), the daily change in the German 10-year Bond yield
(ΔGerman Bond), the daily change in the effective Federal Fund rate (ΔFedFund), the daily change
in the European Repo rate (ΔEuro. Repo), the daily change in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield
(ΔTreasury), the daily change in the TED spread (ΔTedRate), and the change in the Euro Stoxx 50
Volatility index (ΔV2X). Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and Supplyt1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready (2018).
We report results separately for the G10 countries (excluding Canada) and for a sample of major oilexporting countries. The major oil-exporting countries include Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan.
(We exclude ΔTedRate and ΔV2X from our oil-exporters model.) We report robust standard errors in
parentheses below each estimate. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February
2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries.
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Table 3: (Continued)

Intercept
ΔCDSi,t-1
St. Returni,t
∆FX Ratei,t
∆VIXt
S&P500
Returnt
ΔGerman
Bondt
ΔFedFundt
ΔEuro. Repot
ΔTreasuryt
ΔV2Xt
ΔTedRatet
Demandt-1
Supplyt-1
Country FE
Year FE
R2

G10 Countries
Pooled
Panel
OLS
-0.005
0.223**
(0.021)
(0.068)
0.122***
0.121***
(0.028)
(0.012)
-1.106***
-1.106*
(0.055)
(0.523)
-0.592***
-0.584*
(0.088)
(0.282)
0.024
0.024
(0.047)
(0.060)

Oil-Exporting Countries
Pooled
Panel
OLS
-0.004
0.386**
(0.121)
(0.120)
-0.088***
-0.089
(0.012)
(0.051)
-0.013
-0.013
(0.008)
(0.015)
0.070**
0.070
(0.031)
(0.088)
0.097
0.096
(0.139)
(0.077)

0.233***

0.229

-1.529***

-1.527**

(0.072)

(0.268)

(0.254)

(0.461)

-10.991***

-11.026**

-14.443***

-14.279**

(1.086)
-1.642**
(0.647)
-6.928
(4.316)
-1.001
(0.857)
0.001
(0.027)
1.710
(1.389)
-0.114***
(0.030)
0.036**
(0.014)
No
No
0.21

(4.420)
-1.609**
(0.606)
-7.171**
(3.014)
-0.956
(0.848)
0.002
(0.098)
1.607
(1.030)
-0.121***
(0.023)
0.035**
(0.011)
Yes
Yes
0.21

(3.702)
-6.329
(5.292)
3.589
(7.699)
0.798
(3.609)

(3.203)
-5.956**
(1.663)
3.601
(2.136)
0.828
(3.677)

-1.292***
(0.128)
-0.151**
(0.074)
Yes
Yes
0.05

-1.287**
(0.374)
-0.149**
(0.034)
No
No
0.05
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Table 4: Quantile Regression Model of Daily Spread Changes
This table reports estimates for a quantile regression daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads on oil
demand and supply shocks. DOMESTICj,i,t and GLOBALj,t are the set of control variables described
in Table 3 and in the text. Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and
Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready
(2018). Panel A includes all the G10 countries except for Canada, and Panel B includes Russia, Iraq,
UAE, and Kazakhstan. We report robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from July 2009 to
December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018 for the oilexporting countries.
Panel A: G10 Countries
Quantile
Intercept
ΔCDSi,t-1
Demandt-1
Supplyt-1

DOMESTICj,i,t
GLOBALj,t

0.25
-0.685***
(0.017)
0.066***
(0.023)
-0.097***
(0.013)
0.013**
(0.005)

0.50
-0.014**
(0.005)
0.066***
(0.017)
-0.059***
(0.006)
0.003
(0.004)

YES
YES

YES
YES

0.75
0.656***
(0.016)
0.092***
(0.021)
-0.080***
(0.008)
0.017**
(0.006)
YES
YES

Panel B: Oil-Exporting Countries

Intercept
ΔCDSi,t-1
Demandt-1
Supplyt-1
DOMESTICj,i,t
GLOBALj,t

Quantile
0.25
-2.318***
(0.217)
0.007
(0.018)
-0.458***
(0.104)
0.002
(0.041)
YES
YES

0.50
-0.097*
(0.057)
0.014*
(0.008)
-0.338***
(0.043)
-0.041**
(0.016)
YES
YES
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0.75
2.801***
(0.239)
0.029***
(0.008)
-0.641***
(0.116)
-0.082*
(0.045)
YES
YES

Table 5: Transition Probabilities, Expected Duration and other Indicators
This table reports transition probabilities of a Markov Switching panel regression model of daily
changes in CDS spreads on oil demand and supply shocks. The transition probabilities are reported
as 𝑃𝑖𝐽 . The expected duration of being in state i are reported as 𝐷𝑈𝑖 i.e., DU1 for state 1 and DU2 for
state 2. Sigma 1 and Sigma 2 are the standard deviation of state 1 and 2, respectively. The maximized
log-likelihood value is denoted as LL. The RCM is the regime classification measure. The G10
sample includes all the G10 countries except for Canada, and the Oil-exporting countries sample
includes Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from
February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries.
P11

P12

P21

P22

DU1

DU2

Sigma 1

Sigma 2

LL

RCM

G 10

0.97

0.03

0.10

0.90

32.15

9.98

0.82***

7.2***

-44,187.83

0.002

OilExporting
Countries

0.94

0.06

0.19

0.81

16.2

5.15

2.58***

20.11***

-20,505.46

0.005
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Table 6: Markov Switching Panel Model
This table reports estimates of a Markov Switching panel regression model of daily changes in
sovereign CDS spreads on oil demand and supply shocks. DOMESTICj,i,t and GLOBALj,t are the set
of control variables described in Table 3 and in the text. Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the
demand side of oil, and Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks
constructed as in Ready (2018). The G10 sample includes all countries except for Canada, and the
major oil-exporting countries’ column includes the following countries: Russia, Iraq, UAE, and
Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is
from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018
for the oil-exporting countries.
State 1
Demandt-1
Supplyt-1
DOMESTICj,i,t
GLOBALj,t
State 2
Demandt-1
Supplyt-1
DOMESTICj,i,t
GLOBALj,t

G 10
-0.072***
(0.007)
0.007
(0.004)
YES
YES
G 10
-0.658***
(0.092)
0.114*
(0.063)
YES
YES
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Exporting Countries
-0.259***
(0.047)
-0.031
(0.026)
YES
YES
Exporting Countries
-2.484***
(0.428)
-0.532**
(0.261)
YES
YES

Table 7: The Effect of Global Economic Conditions on the Relation Between Soverign CDS
Spreads and Oil Shocks
This table reports estimates for a panel regression model of daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads
on oil demand and supply shocks based on the level of global economic activity. DOMESTICj,i,t and
GLOBALj,t are the set of control variables described in Table 3 and in the text. Demandt-1 is the one
day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply
side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready (2018). We use the industrial production index to
differentiate between high and low global economic activities (Hamilton, 2019). High and low global
economic activities are defined as above and below the industrial economic index’s median. Panel A
provides results for above median global economic activity and Panel B provide similar analysis for
below-median global economic activity. The G10 sample includes all countries except for Canada,
and the major oil-exporting countries’ column includes the following countries: Russia, Iraq, UAE,
and Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample
period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to
December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries.
Panel A: Above-Median Global Economic Activity
G 10
Demandt-1
Supplyt-1
DOMESTICj,i,t
GLOBALj,t

-0.056
(0.031)
0.023
(0.020)
YES
YES

Exporting Countries
-0.442
(0.199)
-0.286***
(0.047)
YES
YES

Panel B: Below-Median Global Economic Activity
G 10
Demandt-1
Supplyt-1
DOMESTICj,i,t
GLOBALj,t

-0.207***
(0.062)
0.046**
(0.019)
YES
YES
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Exporting Countries
-1.502**
(0.316)
0.094
(0.103)
YES
YES

Table 8: The Effect of Countries’ Oil Dependency on the Relation Between Soverign CDS
Spreads and Oil Shocks
This table reports estimates for a panel regression model of daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads
on oil demand and supply shocks based on the country’s reliance on oil imports/revenues.
DOMESTICj,i,t and GLOBALj,t are the set of control variables described in Table 3 and in the text.
Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged
shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready (2018). For the G10 countries
(reported in Panel A), we use the ratio of energy imports to total energy domestic use to differentiate
between high and low imported oil dependency. For the oil-exporting countries (in Panel B), we use
the ratio of oil rents to GDP to differentiate between high and low oil revenue dependency. The G10
sample includes all countries except for Canada, and the major oil-exporting countries’ column
includes the following countries: Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the
G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries.
Panel A: G10 Countries
Dependence on Oil Imports
Above-Median
Below-Median
Demandt-1

-0.188***
(0.030)

Supplyt-1

0.054**

-0.150***
(0.014)
0.027**

(0.022)

(0.011)

DOMESTICj,i,t

YES

YES

GLOBALj,t

YES

YES

Panel B: Oil-Exporting Countries
Dependence on Oil Revenues
Above-Median
Below-Median
Demandt-1

-0.517*

-1.102***

(0.292)

(0.076)

-0.142**

-0.140

(0.068)

(0.095)

DOMESTICj,i,t

YES

YES

GLOBALj,t

YES

YES

Supplyt-1
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Figure 1: Greece Sovereign CDS Spread Level from May 2013 to December 2017

9000

8000

7000

On June 30, 2015, Greece
missed its scheduled 1.55
billion euros payment

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

Figure 2: Sovereign CDS Spread Levels
This figure graphs the 5-year sovereign CDS spread for the G10 countries (excluding Canada)
from July 2009 to December 2018 and the 5-year sovereign CDS spread for our sample of oilexporting countries (Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan) from February 2011 to December 2018.
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Figure 2 (Continued)
Panel B - Oil-Exporting Countries
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Figure 3: Smoothed Probabilities for the High Volatility State from the Bivariate MarkovSwitching Model
G10

Oil Exporting Countries
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